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The century-old question concerning the effect of the commerce clause
on the power of the states, either to regulate or to tax interstate commerce,
is being considered anew in the Supreme Court .... [W]hat, if anything,
have the courts to do with cases involving state action contested on the
ground that it interferes with interstate commerce? Do such cases raise
justiciable questions? Or are they political in character, determinable
solely by Congress in the exercise of its power under the commerce

clause?'
"Forgive me. I am confused by shadows."2

I. INTRODUCTION

Giving meaning to the shadows cast by the congressional commerce
power has proven elusive. On its face, the Commerce Clause makes the clear
statement that Congress shall have the power to regulate commerce among the
several states.3 The Supremacy Clause4 establishes the clear principle that

1. Noel T. Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 VA. L. Rv.1, 1 (1940).
2. MAN oF LA MANCHA (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1972) (spoken by Don Quixote on his death

bed).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3 (Congress shall have the power "[t]o regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes"). Questions

about the scope of the Commerce Clause, although contentious prior to the New Deal, have been
deemed more or less settled in light ofWickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942) (holding
that the scope of the Commerce Clause extends to wheat grown for home consumption); Heart
of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964) (holding that a motel has a

sufficient impact on commerce to be covered by congressional legislation); and Perez v. United
States, 402 U.S. 146, 156-57 (1971) (holding that the scope of congressional power under the
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What remains
states cannot regulate contrary to congressional action.'
unclear, however, are the myriad shadows cast by the Commerce Clause on
the state's power to regulate commerce in the absence of congressional action.
This jurisprudence is commonly referred to as the "dormant" Commerce
Clause.'
A method to reconcile dormant Commerce Clause cases can be sewn from
the threads of wisdom that weave their way through the jurisprudence and
critical commentary. While there is widespread agreement that the doctrine
is incoherent, justices and scholars disagree among themselves as to the way
out of the muddle. Simply put, the law fails to ask and answer in a consistent
way where the line should be drawn between permissible and impermissible
regulation under the dormant Commerce Clause.
This Article proposes that the Court ask whether a regulation discriminates in effect against interstate commerce: Does a regulation disadvantage
commercial interests outside the state? If so, then whether a regulation should
be presumed permissible or impermissible should flow from the character of
the regulation. The Court traditionally has upheld health and safety measures;
thus, such regulations should be presumed permissible absent contrary
evidence of discriminatory economic effect and a discriminatory purpose. If
a regulation can be fairly characterized as an economic regulation in effect,
then the Court should presume the regulation invalid given the Court's
traditional concern about discriminatory economic measures in effect. Of
course, this presumption could be overcome by providing contrary evidence
of the health and safety effects furthered by the measure and the absence of a
discriminatory purpose. In the difficult case of a mixed effect regulation, the
Court should apply a predominant health and safety effect test similar to the
predominant public purpose doctrine used in Takings Clause jurisprudence.'

Commerce Clause extends to loansharking).
4. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land .... ").
5. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203 (1983) ("It is well-established that within Constitutional limits
Congress may preempt state authority by so stating in express terms." (citing Jones v. Rath
Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824)
("In every such case, the act of Congress, or the treaty, is supreme; and the law of the State,
though enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted, must yield to it.").
6. See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677, 1687-88 (1994)
(O'Connor, J., concurring); Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S.Ct. 1904, 1911 (1992); CTS
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 87 (1987).
7. See, e.g., Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 239-44 (1984) ("[W]here the
exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, the
Court has never held a compensated taking to be proscribed by the Public Use Clause." Id. at
241.)
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The advantage of this model is a link between the traditional concerns of
the Court and the root concept of discrimination in effect. This synthesis
connects future doctrine to past judicial decisionmaking. From the root of
preventing discrimination in effect as a constitutional objective has grown the
trunk of the Commerce Clause and the limbs of judicially developed
limitations. Some limitations have been tried and discarded as unworkable.
Other limitations, such as the discrimination rule and the balancing test for
stemming undue burdens on commerce, survive. The next generation of
growth in the doctrine must look beyond fiction to discrimination in effect
against interstate commerce. This growth is necessary if the root of
preventing discrimination in effect is to hold fast through the Commerce
Clause and commercial challenges of tomorrow.
Under current law, the Court will ask whether a regulation discriminates
against8 or unduly burdens9 interstate commerce. What the Court does not
ask is where the line should be drawn between permissible and impermissible
state discrimination. As a result, the Court has failed to produce a clear
jurisprudence defining the permissible limits of state discrimination. This
problem can be remedied if the Court adopts a discrimination in effects
approach for separating permissible from impermissible discrimination.
Discrimination in effect means state-induced disadvantage to commercial
interests outside the state. This approach would produce more consistent and

8. While the Court has failed to define discrimination in clear, unqualified terms within the
contextof the Commerce Clause, Professor Donald Regan's assessment that discrimination means
a form of protectionism, see Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism:
Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1091, 1093 n.3 (1986)
seems to fit what the Court has meant. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138, 143-44, 151
(1986) (upholding a regulation discriminatory on its face despite evidence of protectionism
because of the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives and the presence of a legitimate
local purpose); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350-51
(1977) (holding a regulation to be discriminatory because it had the effect of raising costs for
foreign interests, thus disadvantaging commercial interests outside the state while benefiting
commercial interests within the state); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978)
(finding it unnecessary to resolve the issue of discriminatory purpose because the regulation was
discriminatory "[b]oth on its face and in its plain effect"); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery
Co., 449 U.S. 456, 460, 471 (1981) (holding that although the trial court found that the "actual
basis" of the regulation was protectionist, the Court found no discrimination because the
regulation applied uniformly to all producers); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349,
353-54 (1951) (holding that a regulation, while free ofdiscriminatory purpose, was discriminatory
in effect because it excluded milk produced and pasteurized in Illinois from being distributed and
sold in Madison, Wisconsin).
9. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (holding that whether a facially
neutral regulation enacted for a legitimate local purpose unduly burdens interstate commerce
depends upon whether "the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation
to the putative local benefits" (citing Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S.
440, 443 (1960))).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol46/iss3/2

4

Twyman: Beyond Purpose: Addressing State Discrimination In Interstate Com

1995]

DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE-

predictable results than the current doctrine of the Court.
Of course, a discrimination-in-effects approach could produce a different
result in some cases than would be reached under the current law. Questions
asked by the Court currently need not recognize the real discriminatory impact
on interstate commerce.' 0 Moreover, even if the Court acknowledges
discrimination in effect on interstate commerce, the regulation may still be
upheld if the state demonstrates that no less restrictive alternatives existed to
serve a legitimate local purpose."
Part II of this Article begins with a summary of the jurisprudence
concerning the Commerce Clause in its dormant state. Part I presents a
series of proposals from the critical literature. Part IV outlines a system for
gauging discriminatory effects against interstate commerce. Part V demonstrates how a discriminatory effects approach would work in practice. Part VI
examines the advantages of a discrimination in effect model. Finally, Part VII
concludes my argument.
II. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE

While scholars and justices have not always agreed among themselves
about the purpose of the commerce power, one objective of the power to
regulate commerce among the states must be the removal of impediments to
trade. Subsection II.A. will show that other explanations of the Commerce
Clause are less appealing and less sound. Subsection II.B. will discuss
questions asked by the modern Court in its review of state regulations.
Because the Court fails to ask where the line should be drawn between
permissible and impermissible state discrimination, many Commerce Clause
decisions lack the clarity of the proposed case analysis. A review of the
caselaw will reveal that none of the doctrines used by the Court is successful
because the rules themselves have proven uncertain in application. 2
A. The Vision Behind the Dormant Commerce Clause
Before reviewing the Commerce Clause jurisprudence, one must

10. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 126 n.16 (1978) (indicating
that the Court said it is permissible to discriminate as long as there is "no demonstrable effect
whatsoever on the interstate flow of goods").
11. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 138 (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 311, 336 (1979)).
12. Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 259-60 (1987)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court's applications of the dormant Commerce Clause
since the doctrine was adopted have made no sense); CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,
481 U.S. 69, 87 (1987) (observing that "interpretation of 'these great silences of the Constitution'
has not always been easy to follow" (quoting H.P. Mood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S.
525, 535 (1949)).
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understand the aim of the commerce power. A clear objective of the
commerce power is to facilitate the removal of trade barriers. 13 This

Subsection will explain why this conception of the Commerce Clause is more

sensible than the alternatives. 4 Other interpretations may be plausible but
they are less free from doubt than a concrete purpose of eliminating trade

barriers.
Several factors suggest that a concern with free trade was the motivation.
First, the Commerce Clause has its roots in the inability of the national
government under the Articles of Confederation to address barriers blocking
interstate trade. 5 Before adoption of the Constitution, a majority of states
"levied tariffs on imports. "16 These state's regulations were protectionist
against out-of-state interests17 and were inconsistent in the amount of

13. For example, see Justice Jackson's opinion for the Court in H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v.
Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949):
Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer and every
craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will have free
access to every market in the Nation, that no home embargoes will withhold his
export, and no foreign state will by customs duties or regulations exclude them.
Likewise, every consumer may look to the free competition from every producing
area in the Nation to protect him from exploitation by any.
Du Mond, 336 U.S. at 539; see also Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 618
(1981) ("([T]he very purpose of the Commerce Clause was to create an area of free trade among
the several states.'" (quoting McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 330 (1944))); Great
Ad. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 370-71 (1976) (observing that the purpose of the
Commerce Clause is to foster free trade). But see Edward W. Kitch, Regulation and the
American Common Market, in REGULATION, FEDERALISM, AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE 9, 1519 (A. Dan Tarlock ed. 1981) (questioning the extent of protectionism among the states under
the Articles of Confederation).
14. Some scholars have argued that the Commerce Clause is best understood from a political
process standpoint. In reviewing regulations, the Court should be guided by a need to remedy
defects in the legislative process. See Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to
Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425 (1982); Mark Tushnet, Rethinking theDormant Commerce Clause, 1979
Wisc. L. REv. 125 (1979) [hereinafter Rethinking].
Tushnet might now be open to an alternative conception: The commerce power is an
opportunity for cementing "national citizenship." See Letter from Mark Tushnet, Associate
Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law School, to Winkfield F. Twyman, Jr., Associate
Professor of Law, California Western School of Law, (April 18, 1994) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Tushnet Letter].
15. See ANDREW C. MCLAUGHLIN, THE CONFEDERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION, 17831789 86-87, 173-74,261-62 (1905); RICHARD B. MORRIS, THE FORGING OF THE UNION: 17811789 148-52 (1987); Albert S. Abel, The Commerce Clause in the ConstitutionalConvention and
in Contemporary Comment, 25 MINN. L. REv. 432, 442-446 (1941).
For an interesting and vigorous difference of opinion about trade barriers under the Articles
of Confederation, see Richard B. Collins, Economic Union as a ConstitutionalValue, 63 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 43, 57-58 (1988) and Kitch, supra note 13, at 15-19.
16. MORRIS, supra note 15, at 148.
17. See, e.g., id. at 149-50.
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protection offered to home state industry and in the objectives pursued.' 8
Second, "nearly universal agreement" existed among the delegates to the
Constitutional Convention that Congress must have the power to regulate
interstate commerce." Delegates were weary of trade wars and commercial
gamesmanship.Y Without a national power to remove trade barriers, the new
Constitution might have suffered the same fate as the Articles of Confederation. 21

Third, the Court has been guided by a recognition that impediments to
interstate commerce must be addressed if Congress has failed to regulate.'
Using Du Mond as an example, the Court has been sensitive to a "deeply
rooted" theme: states may not "retard, burden or constrict the flow of...
commerce for their economic advantage."' While'some question whether
the Court should interpret the dormant Commerce Clause as a threshold
matter, the general consensus is that a healthy flow of commerce has been
good for the prosperity of the country.24
Finally, trade barriers are readily identifiable. Customarily, the Court has
to decide upon the constitutionality of regulations that clearly raise the costs
of doing business,' quarantine the state from entering goods,2 6 prohibit the
exportation of commercial items,27 protect in-state industries from interstate
competition,28 or retard the transportation of products across state lines. 29
In all of these instances, the barriers to trade can be quantified in economic

18. Id. at 149.
19. Abel, supra note 15, at 443-44.
20. See, e.g., id. at 449 n.70 ("Does one of the states attempt to raise a little money by
imports or other commercial regulations? A neighbouring state immediately alters her laws, and
defeats the revenue by throwing the trade into a different channel. Instead of supporting or
assisting, we are uniformly taking the advantage of one another." (quoting Hugh Williamson,
Remarks on the New Plan of Government, in ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 393, 403 (Paul L. Ford, ed., 1892)).
21. See, e.g., id. at 444 ("The proponents of the new system consistently dwelt on the lack
of such power as one of the chief circumstances which had rendered needful a re-constitution of
the federal arrangement. ....
").
22. See Collins, supra note 15, at 63.
23. Du Mond, 336 U.S. at 533.
24. Even Professor Kitch would share in this assessment though he would take great exception
to the instrumental means of reaching this prosperity. See Collins, supra note 15, at 124-26.
25. See infra footnote and text accompanying footnote.
26. See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986); City of Philadelphiav. New Jersey, 437
U.S. 617 (1978).
27. See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
28. See, e.g., Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27 (1980); Hunt, 432 U.S. 333;
Dean Milk Co., 340 U.S. 349.
29. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981); Pike, 397 U.S.
137; Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); Bowman v. Chicago
& N.W. Ry., 125 U.S. 465 (1888).
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terms. For example, the North Carolina regulation in Hunt "stripp[ed] away
from the Washington apple industry the competitive and economic advantages
it ha[d] earned for itself through its expensive inspection and grading
system. "0 The regulation prevented Washington apple growers from affixing
Washington apple grade labels on closed containers of apples shipped into
North Carolina in spite of the preference of apple brokers, dealers, and
customers for Washington grade apples.31 The Court quite easily grasped the
regulation's impact on trade between Washington and North Carolina.
For these reasons, there can be little doubt that the commerce power is
designed to further free trade. Moreover, the Court has successfully
interpreted the Commerce Clause with this vision in mind. As a result, states
are aware that ruthless protectionism will not be permitted in the marketplace.
Not only is free trade the goal animating the Commerce Clause, 32 but it also
explains the positions the Court has taken in this area.
Some commentators have suggested that the political process offers a
better way of understanding the dormant Commerce Clause.33 Rather than
focus on a substantive value such as free trade, these commentators believe the
Court should review the legislative process for indications that out-of-state
interests have been disadvantaged. 31 While a process-based model is
appealing because, presumably, states should not take advantage of outsiders,35 it raises several difficulties nonetheless.
First, out-of-state commercial interests might be well-represented in the
legislative halls of state governments. 36 A series of recent stories has
documented the influence-peddling by monied interests without regard to
political party or affiliation.3 7 In a particularly striking example, commercial

30. Hunt, 432 U.S. at 351.
31. Id.
32. Contra Eule, supra note 14, at 434-35 (explaining that the common misconception of a
free trade model in dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence derives from the historical
coincidence that protectionism begat the Constitutional Convention).
33. See id. at 437-43; Rethinking, supra note 14, at 130-31.
34. See, e.g., South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 185 n.2
(1938). Speaking for the Court, Justice Harlan Stone cautioned that the Court had a special
responsibility when the legislativeprocess malfunctioned to the detriment of out-of-state interests:
"[W]hen the regulation is of such a character that its burden falls principally upon those without
the state, legislative action is not likely to be subjected to those political restraints which are
normally exerted on legislation where it affects adversely some interests within the state." Id.

(citations omitted).
35. See, e.g., Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., 486 U.S. 888, 893 (1988); Dean
Milk Co., 340 U.S. 349, 354; Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935). But
see Commonwealth Edison Co., 453 U.S. at 617-19 (upholding state severance tax even though
90% of the tax burden fell on citizens of other states).
36. See infra text accompanying notes 37-38.
37. See infra note 239 and accompanying text.
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interests lobbying for specific bills in New York gave $920,050 of the
combined $1.3 million raised by the Democratic and Republican parties in
both houses of the legislature.38 Second, an emphasis on the political process
misreads the nature of the commerce power. Professor Collins sensibly argues
that the commerce power is not anchored around majoritarian concerns of
democratic rights.39 While political process models are understandable in the
context of personal rights, the issue of whether state X can regulate Y
commercial activity implicates structural concerns. In other words, does the
structure of the Constitution fence out state regulation of Y activity?
Answering this question is not easy, but the answer does not bear upon the
relationship of a citizen to a state; rather, the answer flows from the
relationship of the state to the national government. Finally, the political
process model for understanding the Constitution has been called into serious
The theory is problematic because not everyone agrees that
question.'
participation in the political process is a basic value.41 This lack of consensus makes one wary about the principled foundation supporting the political
process conception.
Professor Tushnet has raised an alternative method of understanding the
dormant Commerce Clause: the power "is designed to create something like
a sense of national citizenship." 42 If one accepts this position, then the
dormant Commerce Clause should ban intentional or facial discrimination only
and not perceived discrimination in effect against commercial interests.
While the jurisprudence could be explained as the Court's development
of a national entity, several troubling concerns come to mind. This argument
is problematic because it is doubtful that such a design existed in the minds of
the drafters of the Commerce Clause and less certain that contemporary courts
aim toward such a goal. The framers of the Constitution knew how to
advance national unity as indicated by the Supremacy Clause and more broadly
by the creation of a strong central government. Of course, the power to
regulate commerce among the several states furthers national unity, but a
stronger argument can be made that the design behind the dormant Commerce
Clause tackles the more concrete problem of removing state impediments to
interstate commerce. The limited remarks about the Commerce Clause at the
Constitutional Convention indicate a general frustration with destructive tariffs

38. See infra note 239.
39. Collins, supra note 15, at 111.

40. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistenceof Process-BasedConstitutional
Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980); Mark Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The
Contributionsof John Hart Ely to ConstitutionalTheory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037 (1980).
41. Tushnet, supra note 40, at 1045-46.
42. Tushnet Letter, supra note 14, at 1. I should quickly add that this position might not
represent Tushnet's current thinking about the dormant Commerce Clause but rather a plausible
challenge to a free trade perspective.
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and trade wars, not a specific call for national citizenship.43
Contemporary courts are as likely to bless state's attempts to make their
45
4
own way as they are to bless a vision of national unity. Kassel, Hunt,
and Dean Milk Co. 46 support the national unity proposition, but Taylor,47
Exxon Corp.,48 and Clover LeaPf assuredly undercut the notion that states
should not venture out on their own. The argument that contemporary courts
use the dormant Commerce Clause to bolster national unity explains just part
of the judicial story. For these reasons, the national unity vision is less
satisfying for understanding the dormant Commerce Clause than the simple
aim of promoting a national market free from disruptive state regulation.
B. The Modem Caselaw
Understanding the response of the modem Court to this doctrinal
quandary must begin with Justice Harlan Fiske Stone. In Di Santo v.
Pennsylvania0 Justice Stone began a long campaign against the distinction
between direct and indirect.5" Before Di Santo the Court examined whether
a state's regulation had produced a direct or indirect impact on interstate
commerce. These labels proved untrustworthy for drawing a line between
permissible and impermissible regulation. Therefore, Stone advised that one
must consider
all the facts and circumstances, such as the nature of the regulation, its
function, the character of the business involved and the actual effect on the
flow of commerce, [to reach] the conclusion that the regulation concerns
interests peculiarly local and does not infringe the national interest in
maintaining the freedom of commerce across state lines.52

43. See supranotes 15-21 and accompanying text.
44. 450 U.S. 662 (1981) (holding that a restrictionon 65-foot double-trailer truck violated the
Commerce Clause).
45. 432 U.S. 333 (1977) (holding that a state statute prohibiting the placement of Washington
apple grade labels on closed containers imported into the state violated the Commerce Clause).
46. 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (holding that a city ordinance requiring milk sold within the city
limits to be processed within a defined radius violated the Commerce Clause).
47. 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (holding that the state of Maine could prohibit the importation of
nonnative baitfish).
48. 437 U.S. 117 (1978) (holding that the state of Maryland could prohibit affiliates of
refiners from operating service stations within the state).
49. 449 U.S. 456 (1981) (holding that the state of Minnesota could prohibit the sale of milk
in plastic containers).
50. 273 U.S. 34 (1927), overruledon other grounds by California v. Thompson, 313 U.S.
109 (1941).
51. See id. at 44 (Stone, J., dissenting).
52. Id.
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While Stone reasoned in terms of "local" and "national" interests, he had
begun the intellectual move toward a multi-factor analysis.
In South CarolinaState Highway Department v. Barnwell Bros. 53 Justice
Stone offered the beginnings of a reasonableness standard for review of a
state's regulations. South Carolina had enacted a regulation prohibiting trucks
exceeding a width of ninety inches and a gross weight of 20,000 pounds from
using state highways. 4 Several truckers and interstate shippers brought suit
against state officials to enjoin enforcement of the regulation as an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.55 The three-judge district court ruled
against the state, holding that "the weight and width prohibitions place an
unlawful burden on interstate motor traffic passing over specified highways of
the state." 6 The state appealed the adverse ruling.
Speaking for a unanimous Court, Justice Stone set out a new reasonableness approach for deciding whether a state regulation is permissible.57 In the
absence of congressional legislation, "the judicial function, under the
commerce clause as well as the Fourteenth Amendment, stops with the inquiry
whether the state legislature in adopting regulations such as the present has
acted within its province, and whether the means of regulation chosen are
reasonably adapted to the end sought. "5 On the first point, Stone concluded
without analysis that "a state may impose non-discriminatory restrictions with
respect to the character of motor vehicles moving in interstate commerce as
a safety measure and as a means of securing the economical use of its
highways." 59 On the second point, Stone concluded that the regulation had

53. 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
54. Id. at 180.
55. Id. at 181.
56. Id. The trial court had based its decision on findings
that there is a large amount of motor truck traffic passing interstate in the
southeastern part of the United States, which would normally pass over the
highways of South Carolina, but which will be barred from the state by the
challenged restrictions if enforced, and upon its conclusion that, when
viewed in light of their effect upon interstate commerce, these restrictions
are unreasonable.
Id. at 182.
57. But see Dowling, supra note 1, at 9 ("The test has the familiar ring of Cooley v. The
Board."). In Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851), the Court held that
whether an activity could be regulated depended upon the character of the activity. Cooley, 53
U.S. (12 How.) at 319-20. Some activities would require a single, uniform national rule while
other activities could be regulated by the state. Cooley, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 319-20.
58. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. at 190 (citing Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374 (1932) and
Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251, 272 (1932)).
59. Id. at 190. Dowling questions Stone's conclusory analysis on this point:
But what was the meaning of the requirement, which South Carolina apparently
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some rational relationship to the legislative end of "safe and economical use
of highways."'
1. The BalancingApproach
Two years after the Barnwell decision, Professor Dowling (who would
become the Harlan Fiske Stone Professor of Law at Columbia) criticized the
direct-indirect approach as "far from satisfying" because of its reliance on
mere labels and mechanical tests.6" Dowling also questioned the Cooley
vision of the justification for judicial intervention in dormant Commerce
Clause cases. In Dowling's view, the proper justification for intervention
should be when a state's regulation produces an "unreasonable interference"
with commerce. 62 To define "unreasonable interference" in Dowling's
formulation required a balancing of national and local interests followed by a
judgment determining which interest should prevail.63
Professor Gunther speculates that Dowling's definitive article might have
influenced the Court's decision to adopt a balancing approach for dormant
Commerce Clause cases.' 4 In Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel.
Sullivan,' the Court heard a challenge to an Arizona law prohibiting trains
of more than fourteen passenger cars or seventy freight cars from operating
within the state.'
Justice Stone reversed the Arizona Supreme Court, holding that the proper
inquiry was not "whether there is basis for the conclusion . .. that the
[prohibited conduct] ha[d] an adverse impact upon safety of operation. "67
Rather, the decisive question was whether "the total effect of the law as a
safety measure in reducing accidents and casualties [was] so slight or
problematical as not to outweigh the national interest in keeping interstate
commerce free from interferences which seriously impede it ..
Stone

satisfied, that the State act "within its province"? It was met here, said the Court,
by previous decisions upholding state restrictions with respect to the character of
motor vehicles moving in interstate commerce, designed to insure safe and
economical use of highways. But the question, why have such laws been upheld,
went unanswered.
Dowling, supra note 1, at 9.
60. BarnwellBros., 303 U.S. at 184, 192-96.
61. Dowling, supra note 1, at 6-7.
62. Id. at 20.
63. Id. at 21.
64. See GERALD GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 32 (12th ed.
1991).
65. 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
66. Id. at 763.
67. Id. at 775.
68. Id. at 775-76.
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meticulously reviewed the trial court findings of fact and concluded "that the
Arizona Train Limit Law, viewed as a safety measure, affords at most slight
and dubious advantage, if any, over unregulated train lengths."69 The
number of "slack action"7 accidents in Arizona approximated the accident
rate in Nevada where train lengths were not regulated.7" Perhaps most
damning to the state's case was the trial court's finding that the law requiring
shorter trains would actually raise the accident rate because of the increased
number of trains in operation.72
Stone's balancing approach advanced the Court's ability to decide whether
state regulations were permissible because, unlike earlier approaches, the
Court could emphasize facts and not labels. To this extent, Dowling's hopes
for better guidance have been realized.' The balancing approach has proven
resilient, and the modem Court continues to weigh the state's benefits against
the burdens on interstate commerce. 74 Yet, while an improvement over the
direct-indirect effects test, the modem balancing approach has fallen short of

69. Id. at 779.
70. Justice Stone discussed "slack action" in analyzing the weight of Arizona's safety interest
in its regulation:
The principal source of danger of accident from increased length of trains is the
resulting increase of "slack action" of the train. Slack action is the amount of free
movement of one car before it transmits its motion to an adjoining coupled car...
. The length of the train increases the slack since the slack action of a train is the
total of the free action movement between its several cars. The amount of slack
action has some effect on the severity of the shock of train movements, and on freight
trains sometimes results in injuries to operatives .... The amount and severity of
slack action, however, are not wholly dependent upon the length of the train ....
Southern Pac., 325 U.S. at 776-77.
71. Id. at 777.
72. Id. at 777-78.
73. See Dowling, supra note 1, at 19-20.
74. For a representative overview of the modem Court's reliance "on an ad hoc balancing of
interests based on theparticularfacts of each case," see Earl M. Maltz, How Much Regulation
Is Too Much-An Examination of Commerce Clause Jurisprudence,50 GEO.WASH. L. REv. 47,
48-49, 58-64 (1981) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
Since the Court's adoption of the balancing approach for dormancy issues in Southern
Pacific, many commentators have roundly criticized balancing as inherently uncertain in
application. See id. at 48 (citing Louis Henkin, Infallibility Under Law: Constitutional
Balancing, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1022, 1047 (1978); Gary C. Leedes, The Supreme CourtMess,
57 TEx. L. REV. 1361, 1415-21 (1979); and Rethinking, supra note 14, at 128). For an
additional critique that nicely questions the weighing of burdens on interstate commerce and
benefits to the state as an instrument for dormant Commerce Clause adjudication, see Maltz,
supra at 58-64.
I agree that the balancing approach will not bring order to the jurisprudence. Order implies
being able to obtain a predictable result from the application of doctrine, which is inconsistent
with the underlying point of balancing: the weighing of burdens and benefits to reach tailor-made
outcomes.
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its early promise to instill order in dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
On many occasions, the Court lays out the balancing rule but then decides that
the regulation impermissibly burdens interstate commerce or that the benefit
from the regulation outweighs incidental or permissible effects on interstate
commerce. Unfortunately, the Court fails to provide state lawmakers with a
clear guide to the difference between permissible and impermissible regula75
tion.
The inherent difficulties of the balancing approach are ilustrated by
Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp.76 Unlike all other states in the
West and Midwest, Iowa chose to prohibit the general use of sixty-five-foot
double trucks within its borders.' The Iowa regulation specifically restricted
most truck combinations to fifty-five feet in length.78 However, the regulation did permit special trailers called doubles, mobile homes, trucks carrying
vehicles such as tractors and other farm equipment, and singles hauling
livestock to be as long as sixty feet.79 The State justified its measure as a
reasonable safety regulation."0
Because of the regulation, Consolidated Freightways could not use its
sixty-five-foot doubles to move goods through Iowa. 1 Instead, the company
could choose one of these options: "(i) use 55-foot singles; (ii) use 60-foot
doubles; (iii) detach the trailers of a 65-foot double and shuttle each through

75. See Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988)(Scalia,
J.,
concurring) (arguing that balancing burdens on commerce with benefits to a state "ismore like
judging whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy").
76. 450 U.S. 662 (1981) (plurality opinion). While Kassel is superb for illustrating the
problems with a balancing approach, other cases could be used to make the same general point.
For examples, see Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981); Raymond
Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137
(1970); Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946); Southern Pac., 325 U.S. 761.
77. Kassel, 450 U.S. at 665. Justice Powell explained the differences between Consolidated's
two types of trucks as follows:
Consolidated mainly use[d] two kinds of trucks. One consistfed] of a three-axle
tractor pulling a 40-foot two-axle trailer. This unit, commonly called a single, or
.semi," [was] 55 feet in length overall. Such trucks ha[d] long been used on the
Nation's highways. Consolidated also use[d] a two-axle tractor pulling a single-axle
trailer which, in turn, pulls a single-axle dolly and a second single-axle trailer. This
combination, known as a double, or twin, [was] 65 feet long overall.
Id. (footnote omitted).
78. Id.

79. Id. at 665-66 (footnotes omitted) (citing IOWA CODE § 321.457(3)-(6) (1979)). Iowa
amended its law to permit all singles to be as large as 60 feet after the lower courts' decisions.
Id. at 666.
80. Kassel, 450 U.S. at 667 ("The State asserted that 65-footdoubles are more dangerous than
55-foot singles.. .
81. Id.
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the State separately; or (iv) divert 65-foot doubles around Iowa."82 Rejecting
these options, Consolidated challenged the Iowa regulation as an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.n
The Court applied a balancing standard and concluded that the Iowa
regulation impermissibly burdened interstate commerce." In reaching this
conclusion, the Court failed to illuminate the amount of safety benefit that
would insulate a state's regulation from challenge.85 Instead, the Court
merely reasoned that "'[t]he total effect of the law as a safety measure in
reducing accidents and casualties is so slight and problematical that it does not
outweigh the national interest in keeping interstate commerce free from
interferences that seriously impede it.'" 8 6 Justice Powell in his majority
opinion dismissed the safety interest as a mere illusion not warranting
protection by the Court. 7
Implicit in Justice Powell's opinion are several unresolved issues as to the
scope of the balancing test. For example, what facts would be sufficiently
weighty to move a regulation from the category of "illusory" to "nonillusory"? Would "illusory" safety regulations be permissible if the impact on
interstate commerce were sufficiently "light"? Similarly, Justice Rehnquist's
dissent fails to take the up the matter of limits in the balancing test. Although
Rehnquist does identify the real problem that "[Kassel] gives no guidance
whatsoever to these States as to whether their laws are valid or how to defend
them," 88 he fails to resolve the problem.
Kassel is especially problematic because of an earlier challenge to a
similar Wisconsin law. The Court in Raymond Motor Transportation,Inc. v.
Rice89 struck down a regulation barring trucks longer than fifty-five feet from
Wisconsin's highways under a balancing test. 9' While concluding that the
regulation placed a substantial burden on interstate commerce with only the
most speculative contribution to highway safety, the Court left unresolved the
issue whether a similar regulation would be upheld if evidence produced on
safety "were not so overwhelmingly one-sided."91 Like the petitioner in

82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 670-71.
85. Kassel, 450 U.S. at 670 (observing that the extent of permissible state regulation is not
always easy to measure, even though regulations that touch upon highway safety are most
protected from judicial scrutiny).
86. Id. at 668 (quoting the reasoning of the trial court in Consolidated Freightways v. Kassel,
475 F. Supp. 544, 551 (1979)).
87. Id. at 671.
88. Id. at 706 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
89. 434 U.S. 429 (1978).
90. Id. at 443-48.
91. Id. at 447.
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Seaboard Air Line Railway Co. v. Blackwell,'
Iowa responded to the
Court's speculations and produced extensive evidence of safety benefits
flowing from the truck length restrictions. 3 If Iowa did not make a sufficient
showing of safety benefits in light of Raymond, it might well be impossible in
effect for a state to regulate highway safety against a commerce challenge. As
Justice Rehnquist noted in dissent: "The result in this case suggests, to
paraphrase Justice Jackson, that the only state truck-length limit 'that is valid
is one which this Court has not been able to get its hands on."
Adding to the confusion of Kassel is the clear precedent set in Barnwell
Bros. that "'[i]n no field has . . . deference to state regulation been greater
than that of highway safety."' 95 Justice Stone in Barnwell Bros. quite clearly
established a deferential level of review for state trucking regulations:
In the absence of such legislation the judicial function, under the commerce clause . . . stops with the inquiry whether the state legislature in
adopting regulations such as the present has acted within its province, and
whether the means of regulation chosen are reasonably adapted to the end
sought.

96

Given the extensive evidence of safety benefits produced by Iowa, it is difficult
to reconcile the Kassel outcome with the Barnwell Bros. precedent.
Thus far, the balancing approach has fallen short of providing clear
guidance to states about the line between permissible and impermissible

Our holding is a narrow one, for we do not decide whether laws of other States
restricting the operation of trucks over 55 feet long, or of double-trailer trucks, would
be upheld if the evidence produced on the safety issue were not so overwhelmingly
one-sided as in this case. The State of Wisconsin has failed to make even a colorable
showing that its regulations contribute to highway safety.
Id. at 447-48 (footnote omitted).
92. 244 U.S. 310, 316 (1917).
93. For example, Iowa demonstrated that (1) "longer vehicles take greater time to be passed,
thereby increasing the risks of accidents, particularly during the inclement weather not uncommon
in Iowa"; (2) "[t]he 65-foot vehicle exposes a passing driver to visibility-impairing splash and
spray during bad weather for a longer period than do the shorter trucks permitted in Iowa";
(3) "[1longer trucks are more likely to clog intersections"; (4) "[l]onger vehicles pose greater
problems at the scene of an accident"; (5) "doubles are more likely than singles to jackknife or
upset;" and (6) "Consolidated's overall accident rate for doubles exceeded that of semis for three
of the last four years and that some of Consolidated's own drivers expressed a preference for the
handling characteristics of singles over doubles." Kassel, 450 U.S. at 694-95 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted).
94. Id. at 687 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Jungersen v. Ostby &Barton Co., 335 U.S.
560, 572 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting)).
95. Id. at 690 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Raymond, 434 U.S. at 443).
96. BarnwellBros., 303 U.S. at 190 (1938) (citing Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374 (1932)
and Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251, 272 (1932)).
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regulation. Iowa demonstrated safety benefits of its regulation, learning from
Wisconsin's failure to do so in Raymond. Yet, the Court found the safety
evidence wanting when weighed against the burden on interstate commerce.
The Court seemingly disregarded the clear precedent of Barnwell Bros.' and
engaged in an in-depth review of the Iowa regulation. Perhaps, the defect
with the balancing approach can be best summed up by Rehnquist's dissent in

Kassel:
The other States with truck-length limits that exclude Consolidated's
65-foot doubles would not at all be paranoid in assuming that they might
be next on Consolidated's "hit list." The true problem with today's
decision is that it gives no guidance whatsoever to these States as to
whether their laws are valid or how to defend them. For that matter, the
decision gives no guidance to Consolidated or other trucking firms either.
Perhaps, after all is said and done, the Court today neither says nor does
very much at all. We know only that Iowa's law is invalid and that the
jurisprudence of the "negative side" of the Commerce Clause remains
hopelessly confused. 98

2. The DiscriminationApproach
When reviewing a state's regulations, the modem Court has also
developed an alternative approach to the balancing test: determining whether
a regulation discriminates against interstate commerce." Once the Court
97. The Kassel Court did attempt to distinguish Barnwell Bros. on the grounds that Barnwell

Bros. involved state highway regulations: "The Court normally does accord 'special deference'
to state highway safety regulations." Kassel, 450 U.S. at 675. (citation omitted). This distinction
is not persuasive because it ignores the real effect on interstate commerce produced by South
Carolina's regulation. The BarnwellBros. Court accepted findings by the trial court that "there
is a large amount of motor truck traffic passing interstate in the southeastern part of the United
States, which would normally pass over the highways of South Carolina, but which will be barred
from the state by the challenged restrictions if
enforced. . . ." Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. at 182.
Thus, a sensible argument could be made that Barnwell Bros. must be viewed as an
aberration in light of the outcomes in Raymond, Kassel, and Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359

U.S. 520 (1959).
98. Kassel, 450 U.S. at 706 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). It should be noted
that "Consolidated was a plaintiff in Raymond as well as this case." Id. at 706 n.14.
99. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enter., 486 U.S. 888, 891 (1988); Maine v. Taylor,
477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986). See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 125 (1978);
Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977); Dean Milk
Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951). While the Court has not always been clear in defining
discrimination, Professor Regan's argument that the Court really means protectionism is
compelling. See supra note 8; City of Philadelphiav. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623-24 (1978):
The opinions of the Court through the years have reflected an alertness to the
evils of 'economic isolation' and protectionism, while at the same time recognizing
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identifies discrimination against interstate commerce, the burden falls on the

state to justify said discrimination."

The state must justify such discrimina-

tion "in terms of the local benefits flowing from the statute and the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to preserve the local interests
at stake."101 The burden of justification for the state is high because the
state must go beyond a mere showing of legitimate objective."2
As with the balancing approach, making sense of the discrimination
approach has proved difficult. The following Subsections show that the Court
has not always recognized discrimination in effect. Moreover, the Court has
not been consistent with its inquiry into the safety benefits flowing from a
discriminatory regulation or the availability of nondiscriminatory alternatives
adequate to preserve the state's interests at stake. The following Subsections
will begin with the Court's sensible application of the discrimination approach
in Hunt, and then compare and contrast the Court's analysis in several
representative cases: Clover Leaf, Exxon Corporation,and Taylor.
a. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising

Commission: A Sensible Result
Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission is a paradigmatic
case. "In 1972, the North Carolina Board of Agriculture adopted an
administrative regulation, unique in the 50 States, which in effect required all

that incidental burdens on interstate commerce may be unavoidable when a State
legislates to safeguard the health and safety of its people. Thus, where simple
economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually per se rule of
invalidity has been erected. . . . But where other legislative objectives are credibly
advanced and there is no patent discrimination against interstate trade, the Court has
adopted a much more flexible approach ....
Id. (citations omitted).
100. Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 626-27; Taylor, 477 U.S. at 138; Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers,
447 U.S. 27, 36 (1980) (quoting Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 626-27); Hunt, 432 U.S. at 353;
Dean Milk Co., 340 U.S. at 354.
101. Hunt, 432 U.S. at 353 (citations omitted). See also Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v,
Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 373 (1976); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); Polar
Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375 U.S. 361, 375 n.9 (1964); Dean Milk Co., 340
U.S. at 354.
102. See Hunt, 432 U.S. at 350 ("[A] finding that state legislation furthers matters of
legitimate local concern, even in the health and consumer protection areas, does not end the
inquiry."); Dean Milk Co., 340 U.S. at 354.
A different view, that the ordinance is valid simply because it professes to be a health
measure, would mean that the Commerce Clause of itself imposes no limitations on
state action other than those laid down by the Due Process Clause, save for the rare
instance where a state artlessly discloses an avowed purpose to discriminate against
interstate goods.
Id. (citation omitted).
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closed containers of apples shipped into or sold in the State to display either
the applicable USDA grade or a notice indicating no classification. " " This
regulation discriminated in effect against the State of Washington, the
country's largest producer of apples, because Washington tested and graded
apples under a system superior to the standards adopted by the United States
Agriculture Department."' 4 In response to the administrative regulation, "the
Washington State Apple Advertising Commission petitioned the North Carolina
Board of Agriculture to amend its regulation to permit the display of state
grades." °" Not only was relief denied but North Carolina in due course
enacted its regulation into law."' 6
As would be expected from these facts, the Court identified several forms
of discrimination produced by the regulation." 7 The Court first observed
that the regulation raised "the costs of doing business in the North Carolina
market for Washington apple growers and dealers, while leaving those of their
North Carolina counterparts unaffected." 08 Secondly, the measure stripped
the Washington apple industry of competitive and economic advantages earned
through its expensive inspection and grading system. ' 9 Finally, the regulation had a "leveling effect" operating to the advantage of local apple
producers.'
While the regulation did not discriminate on its face, the
Court looked beyond the mere language of the regulation to analyze the real
effects on interstate commerce.
Having identified discrimination in effect caused by the regulation, the
Court proceeded to review the justification for the regulation."' North
Carolina, the Court concluded, had failed under the discrimination approach
to demonstrate either local benefits from the statute or the unavailability of
nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to preserve the local interests."'
While North Carolina had an interest in consumer protection, the challenged
regulation did "remarkably little to further that laudable goal at least with
respect to Washington apples and grades.""' Moreover, the Court conclud-

103. Hunt, 432 U.S. at 337.
104. See id. at 336. Washington established its rigorous quality control program "[b]ecause
of the importance of the apple industry to the State." Id.
105. Id. at 338.
106. Id. at 339.
107. Hunt, 432 U.S. at 350-52.
108. Id. at 351.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 351-52.
111. Id. at 353. Accord Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 373 (1976);
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v.
Andrews, 375 U.S. 361, 375 n.9 (1964); Dean Milk Co., 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951).
112. Hunt, 432 U.S. at 353-54.
113. Id. at 353. The Court observed that:
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ed "that nondiscriminatory alternatives to the outright ban of Washington State
grades [were] readily available."114
b. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.
and Exxon Corporation v. Governor of Maryland:

The Existence of Discrimination
As opposed to Hunt, where the Court looked beyond facial and purposeful
discrimination for evidence of discriminatory effects against interstate
commerce, the Court in Clover Leaf Creamery Co."5 failed to acknowledge
purposeful discrimination. The facts in Clover Leaf Creamery Co. are
intricate, but evidence of discrimination is clear nonetheless.
In 1977 Minnesota enacted a regulation "banning the retail sale of milk
in plastic nonreturnable, nonrefillable containers, but permitting such sale in
other nonreturnable, nonrefillable containers, such as paperboard milk
cartons."" 6 The regulation drew a key distinction on its face between
plastic containers (forbidden under all circumstances) and paper, nonrefillable
milk containers (not affected by the regulation). "7 Plastic nonrefillables,
according to the Minnesota Supreme Court, are "high density polyethylene
plastic container(s)" while paper containers are "composed of bleached kraft
paper coated with low density polyethylene, a plastic ... [which] comprises
about 10 percent of the weight of the container.""' The regulation on its
face permitted the retail sale of containers containing less than fifty percent

although the statute is ostensibly a consumer protection measure, it directs its primary
efforts, not at the consuming public at large, but at apple wholesalers and brokers
who are the principal purchasers of closed containers of apples... . Since the statute
does nothing at all to purify the flow of information at the retail level, it does little
to protect consumers against the problems it was designed to eliminate.
Id. But see South Carolina v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 190-92 (1938) (holding that the
judicial inquiry does not extend to reasonableness, wisdom, and propriety of regulation but to
whether regulation lacks a rational basis).
114. Hunt, 432 U.S. at 354. The Court raised the possibility of North Carolina's
permitting out-of-state growers to utilize state grades only if they also marked their
shipments with the applicable USDA label. In that case, the USDA grade would serve
as a benchmark against which the consumer could evaluate the quality of the various
state grades. If this alternative was for some reason inadequate to eradicate problems
caused by state grades inferior to those adopted by the USDA, North Carolina might
consider banning those state grades which, unlike Washington's, could not be
demonstrated to be equal or superior to the corresponding USDA categories.
Id.
115. 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
116. Id. at 458 (citing MINN. STAT. § 116F.21 (1978)).
117. Clover Leaf Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 289 N.W.2d 79, 81 (Minn. 1979).
118. Id. at 81 n.8, 81 n.9.
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plastic but prohibited containers containing more than fifty percent plastic." 9
Representatives of the plastic industry brought an action against the regulation
on Commerce Clause grounds.
In light of these facts, the Clover Leaf Creamery Co. Court failed to
acknowledge that the regulation might have been an attempt to discriminate
against interstate commerce. Why would the legislature distinguish between
nonrefillable containers based solely on the percentage of plastic in the
container? Ostensibly, the purpose of the regulation was to discourage the use
of nonreturnable containers" ° but this purpose is undercut by the regulation's exemption for paper containers that are nonreturnable. Empirical
evidence suggested the regulation would "prolong the use of ecologically
undesirable paperboard milk cartons,"12 thus impeding purported conservation objectives. Perhaps most troubling, the Minnesota District Court "found
that, contrary to the statement of purpose in § 1, the 'actual basis' for the Act
'was to promote the economic interests of certain segments of the local dairy
and pulpwood industries at the expense of the economic interests of other
Without a
segments of the dairy industry and the plastics industry.'""
rigorous analysis of this hint of discrimination, the U.S. Supreme Court
concluded that the regulation did not "effect 'simple protectionism,' but
'regulate[d] evenhandedly' by prohibiting all milk retailers from selling their
products in plastic, nonreturnable milk containers."" Hunt stands for the
proposition that evenhanded or facially neutral regulations can be discriminatory in effect, but the Clover Leaf Creamery Co. Court seemed unwilling to
search too deeply for discriminatory effects.
The Court also did not search deeply for discriminatory effects in Exxon
Corp. v. Governor of Maryland.124 Maryland had enacted a regulation

119. Id. at 81.
120. The legislature finds that the use of nonreturnable, nonrefillable containers
for the packaging of milk and other milk products presents a solid waste
management problem for the state, promotes energy waste, and depletes
natural resources. The legislature therefore, in furtherance of the policies
stated in Minnesota Statutes, Section 116F.01, determines that the use of
nonreturnable, nonrefillable containers for packaging milk and other milk
products should be discouraged and that the use of returnable and reusable
packaging for these products is preferred and should be encouraged.
MINN. STAT. § 116F.21 (1978), quoted in CloverLeaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. at 458-59.
121. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. at 460.
122. Id. (citation omitted). The Minnesota Supreme Court disagreed, however, and "found
that the purpose of the Act was 'to promote the state in terests [sic] of encouraging the reuse and
recycling of materials and reducing the amount and type of material entering the solid waste
stream,' and acknowledged the legitimacy of this purpose." Id. at 460-61 (quoting CloverLeaf
Creamery Co., 289 N.W.2d at 82).
123. Id. at 471.
124. 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
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prohibiting producers or refiners of petroleum products from operating retail
service stations within the state."z Extensive evidence indicated that local
dealers gained protection from interstate commerce under the regulation: (1)
more than ninety-nine percent of in-state retail stations insulated from
competition with out-of-state integrated firms were operated by local business
interests 6 and (2) of the commercial interests excluded from commerce due
to the regulation, ninety-five percent were out-of-state firms operating ninetyeight percent of the affected commercial interests.127
The Court upheld the Maryland regulation as a fiondiscriminatory measure
because the regulation did not discriminate on its face against interstate goods,
nor did it favor local producers and refiners." 8 The Court drew a distinction between discrimination against interstate firms and interstate commerce:
While the refiners will no longer enjoy their same status in the Maryland
market, in-state independent dealers will have no competitive advantage
over out-of-state dealers. The fact that the burden of a state regulation
falls on some interstate companies does not, by itself, establish a claim of
29
discrimination against interstate commerce.
This reasoning is questionable in light of the Hunt analysis because the
Court defined the scope of its inquiry as the narrow market of independent
dealers instead of examining the discriminatory effects of the regulation. 13 0
Finding no advantage to in-state independent dealers in relation to out-of-state
independent dealers,13 ' the Court concluded its inquiry into discriminatory
effects. This limited inquiry into discriminatory effects is not sensible because
independent dealers in Maryland compete not only against out-of-state

125. Id. at 119.

126. Id. at 138 (citation omitted).
127. Id. (citation omitted).
128. See id. at 125.

129. Exxon Corp., 437 U.S. at 126 (footnote omitted). The Court also said that there cannot
be discrimination against interstate commerce because all of the gasoline sold in Maryland is
refined elsewhere, and the same amount will enter the state under this law that entered it
previously. See id. at 125. Yet, the decision clearly eliminated in-state affiliates of producers
and refiners as competitors to in-state independent dealers. Out-of-state independent dealers
continued to face competition from out-of-state affiliates of producers and refiners. Arguably,
the regulation thus sheltered in-state independent dealers, to the extent that in-state independent
dealers faced less competition in the marketplace than their out-of-state independent dealer
counterparts. While the Court focused on the supply of gasoline entering Maryland, tie
regulation's impact is best measured by a competitive advantage which attaches to intrastate
commerce. This market boost to in-state independent dealers constitutes implicit discrimination
against interstate commerce.
130. See id. at 126.
131. Id.
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independent dealers but also against in-state affiliates of producers and refiners
as well. Thus, Exxon when read with.Clover Leaf Creamery Co. suggests a
limited review for discriminatory effects produced by a regulation, a position
that is inconsistent with the Court's analysis in Hunt.
c. Maine v. Taylor: Safety Benefits
as Justificationfor Discrimination
In addition to providing an inconsistent level of review for discrimination,
the Court, when using the discrimination approach, has not been clear about
the showing of benefits needed to justify a discriminatory regulation. This
Subsection compares Hunt with Taylor to demonstrate that the Court's review
of safety benefits to justify a discriminatory regulation has been inconsistent
as well.
As discussed earlier, the Court found few safety benefits produced by the
North Carolina regulation in Hunt.132 Rather than accepting the interest of
"protecting their citizens from confusion and deception in the marketing of
with minimum scrutiny, the Court questioned whether
foodstuffs"'
permitting "the marketing of closed containers of apples under no grades...
[would] eliminate the problems of deception and confusion created by the
multiplicity of differing state grades; indeed, it magnifies them by depriving
purchasers of all information concerning the quality of the contents of closed
apple containers."134 Moreover, the Court questioned why the regulation
directed "its primary efforts not at the consuming public at large, but at apple
wholesalers and brokers who are the principal purchasers of closed containers
of apples. And those individuals are presumably the most knowledgeable
individuals in this area. "135 Accordingly, the Court concluded that "the
statute does nothing at all to purify the flow of information at the retail level,
it does little to protect consumers against the problems it was designed to
eliminate. "136

While this close reading of a state's asserted safety interest is sensible, the
Court has not consistently applied this level of review to safety benefits alleged
by a state. As a result, it is unclear what level of safety benefits is sufficient
to justify a discriminatory regulation. Maine v. Taylor 37 demonstrates how
the Court has departed from the level of review in Hunt of the alleged safety
benefits flowing from a regulation.

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977).
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id.
Id.
477 U.S. 131 (1986).
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In Taylor, Maine had enacted a regulation prohibiting the importation of
live baitfish into the state. 3 Robert Taylor, a Maine resident engaged in
the business of raising golden shiners for commercial sale, 39 "arranged to
have 158,000 live golden shiners delivered to him from outside the State. "140
The U.S. government indicted Taylor for violating a federal law incorporating
the Maine regulation,' 4 ' but Taylor moved to dismiss the indictment on the
ground that Maine's import ban violated the Commerce Clause. 42 The
federal trial court held for the government after concluding that "the state
clearly has a legitimate and substantial purpose in prohibiting the importation
of live bait fish." 43 In making its determination, the trial court relied on
arguments that the regulation helped control "the spread of disease among
Maine's wild fish population" and prevent "the introduction of exotic species
of fish into the State of Maine."'" The trial court further concluded that the
government had demonstrated the unavailability of less discriminatory
alternatives to the regulation, although the court recognized disagreements
among the experts on this issue."
In reversing the trial court, the First Circuit disagreed on the issue of
legitimacy of local purpose and whether less restrictive alternatives were
available to Maine.'4 6 "On the issue of legitimate local purpose, the
statement by the Department of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife, which

138. Id. at 132.
139. United States v. Taylor, 585 F. Supp. 393, 394 n.1 (D. Me. 1984), rev'd, 752 F.2d 757
(1st Cir. 1985), rev'd sub nom. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986). According to Taylor's
testimony, "he [was] unable to -harvest a sufficient number of golden shiners to meet public
demand, especially during the winter ice fishing season when the demand for live bait fish
exceeds the supply." Id.
140. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 132. Golden shiners are a species of bait fish. See id.
141. The district court recited the charges as follows:
The defendant has been charged in a two-count indictment alleging violations of 16
U.S.C. §§ 3372 and 3373, also known as the Lacey Act Amendments of 1981, which
make it a federal offense for any person "to import, export, transport, sell, receive,
acquire or purchase in interstate . . . commerce (A) any fish or wildlife taken,
possessed, transported, or sold in violation of any law ... of any State...
."
Taylor, 585 F. Supp. at 394 (footnotes omitted) (omissions in original) (quoting 16 U.S.C. §
3372(a)(2) (1982)).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 397. The Federal Magistrate concluded that the regulation facially discriminated
against interstate commerce and the trial court accepted this conclusion without further discussion.
See id. at 395. On appeal to the First Circuit Court of Appeals, "[t]he [U.S.] government and
intervenor State of Maine concede[d] that section 7613 discriminate[d] facially against interstate
commerce." United States v. Taylor, 752 F.2d 757, 759 (1st Cir. 1985), rev'd sub nom. Maine
v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
144. Taylor, 585 F. Supp. at 395 (citation omitted).
145. Id. at 398.
146. Taylor, 752 F.2d at 761-63.
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emphasizes benefits to local business accruing from section 7613, evinces an
aura of economic protectionism, which is 'abhorrent to the Commerce
Clause.'" 47 In speaking against a proposed repeal of the regulation, the
Maine Department of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife had taken the following
position:
[W]e can't help asking why we should spend our money in Arkansas when
it is far better spent at home? It is very clear that much more can be done
here in Maine to provide our sportsmen with safe, home-grown bait.
There is also the possibility that such an industry could develop a lucrative
export market in neighboring states.14a
The circuit court also refused to conclude that Maine had "searched for and
found the least discriminatory alternative"149 for advancing the state's
purported interest "in excluding fish parasites and exotic species."' 50 The
circuit court based its analysis on evidence of alternatives adopted in other
states' 5' plus additional options that Maine could have adopted to lessen the
discrimination against interstate commerce.' 52
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the First Circuit in an opinion that
departed from the level of scrutiny given North Carolina's asserted interest in
Hunt. As discussed earlier, the Court in Hunt challenged the state's asserted
interest in consumer protection in an analysis of real benefits flowing from the
regulation. By contrast, the Court accepted questionable assertions of benefits
produced by the regulation scrutinized in Taylor. Rather than frame the legal
issue in terms of whether the challenged regulation furthered the state's
interest, the Court defined the inquiry as whether "the District Court clearly
erred in finding that substantial scientific uncertainty surrounds the effect that
147. Id. at 761 (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 333 (1979)).
148. Id. at 760.
149. Id. at 763.
150. Id. at 759.
151. In a footnote, the Court recounted several regulatory schemes adopted by other states to
advance the same state interest:
Defendant has called to the court's attention a Tennessee regulation providing for
inspection of out-of-state fish .... Cf. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 101.42(6) (West 1977)
(permits required for importationof minnows); S.D.Codified Laws § 41-14-30(1977)
(same); Utah Code Ann. § 23-15-12 (1976) (permission from wildlife board available
for importation of aquatic wildlife); Va. Code § 28.1-183.2 (1979) (administrative
permission available for importation of fish or shellfish).
Taylor, 752 F.2d at 762 n.15.
152. See id. at 762-63. The regulation "block[ed] all inward shipments of live baitfish at the
State's border," thus restricting interstate trade in the most direct manner possible. Maine v.
-Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137 (1986). "[S]ince Maine's import ban discriminate[d] on its face
against interstate trade," the Court focused on whether discrimination could be justified. See id.
at 138.
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baitfish parasites and nonnative species could have on Maine's fisheries. " "
Moreover, the Court expressly recognized "the possibility that [the imperfectly
understood environmental risks] may ultimately prove to be negligible." 5 "
This standard of justification differs markedly from proving that local
benefits do indeed flow from a regulation. No evidence in the opinion
indicated that the ban had reduced the number of parasites in Maine or
prevented parasites from entering Maine.' 55 To the contrary, the regulation
did "not bar all traffic in bait fish; it focuse[d] only on bait fish that [came]
from other states."' 55 "[L]ittle could be done to prevent fish from swimming over the New Hampshire border into Maine.... [T]he state's policy of
permitting importation of freshwater fish undermined the putative goals of the
bait fish law." 5 7 The conflicting freshwater fish policy and the open border
with neighboring New Hampshire brought into question whether the regulation
furthered wild fish protection.5 For the Court to conclude under all of the
above circumstances that sufficient benefits flowed from the regulation to
justify discrimination against interstate commerce meant the Court strayed
from the level of review in Hunt.
This Subsection has demonstrated that the Court has been inconsistent in
reviewing state allegations of safety benefits flowing from challenged

153. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 148.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 140-144, 148. To support its argument that imported bait fish posed a serious
threat to the indigenous wild fish population, Maine identified three parasites that might be found
capillaria catastomi, pleistophora ovariae, and bothriocephalus
in imported bait fish:
opsalichthydis. Taylor, 585 F. Supp. at 395-96.
156. Taylor, 752 F.2d at 761. The First Circuit, for this and other reasons, concluded that
the Maine regulation was not a quarantine statute. Id.
157. Id. at 762 n.12 (citations omitted).
158. There were additional factors as well that undermined the regulation's furtherance of
wildlife protection. For example, (1) "[tlhe defendant's expert testified that capillaria catastomi
is not unique to golden shiners and that . . . it is debatable whether the parasite is a true
pathogen," Taylor, 585 F. Supp. at 395 (citation omitted); (2) "it is the malnutrition, and not the
[capillaria catastomi], which causes the problems of stunted growth in bait fish," id. at 396; (3)
capillaria catastomi "would not affect wild fish to the degree it affects hatchery fish, because
hatchery fish are generally more susceptible to disease, due to their close proximity during
spawning," id. (citation omitted); (4) "[t]he defendant's expert testified that pleistophoraovariae
is strictly a commercial hatchery problem and that while it was possible that it could be
transmitted into the wild fish population,. . . he did not believe the organism presented any
danger," id. (citation omitted); (5) a third parasite, bothriocephalusopsalichthydis,was not found
in the defendant's shipment of bait fish, id. (citation omitted); and, (6) "defendant's expert noted
that once the tapeworm enters a fish population, and despite a certain mortality rate among the
fish, there is little impact after this initial exposure," Taylor, 585 F. Supp. at 396 (citation
omitted).
In light of this evidence, safety benefits might not have mattered to state legislators in
maintaining the regulation. But see Taylor, 477 U.S. at 148.
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regulations. The inconsistency has detracted from a clear and consistent
application of the discrimination approach. The following Subsection shows
that the Court has been inconsistent in its search for available alternatives to
discriminatory regulations as well.
d. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland
and Maine v. Taylor: The Search
for Available Alternatives
A final difficulty with the discrimination approach is the failure of the
Court to engage in a sensible and consistent inquiry for nondiscriminatory
alternatives to a challenged regulation. This Subsection demonstrates the
difficulty of reconciling the search for an alternative in Hunt with the analysis
in Exxon and Taylor. The same difficulty could be shown with equal force
using other cases,' 59 but Exxon and Taylor are the most effective in demonstrating the uncertainty in the alternatives' analyses.
In Exxon Maryland could have established interim procedures for gas
distribution during periods of petroleum shortages. This would have allowed
the independent retailers to have a steady supply of gas without banning
competitors of independents. Another possibility would have been to establish
over time a trust fund of emergency fuel reserves. Either the state or retail
service stations could have contributed some nominal supply during periods of
plenty. During times of petroleum shortages declared either by the governor
or a state administrative officer, independents could have then tapped into the
trust fund until the shortage ended. These suggestions are comparable to the
nondiscriminatory alternatives offered in Hunt. Thus, the Exxon Court failed
to apply the inquiry for nondiscriminatory alternatives in a fashion consistent
with Hunt.'60
Compared with Exxon, Taylor posed a stronger case for nondiscriminatory
or less discriminatory alternatives to achieve a state interest.161 The Court

159. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 678 n.26 (1981)
(declining to discuss whether the law was discriminatory because "the [discrimination] theory was
neither briefed nor argued in this Court"); Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 43
(1980) (noting that "some intermediate form of regulation" might be as effective in protecting
against the alleged evils as "outright prohibition of entry"); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City
of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 448 (1960) (failing to discuss less discriminatory alternatives even
though regulation probably discriminated in effect against interstate commerce).
160. Of course, the Court rejected the proposition that discrimination existed as a threshold
matter. Exxon, 437 U.S. at 125. The Court could have assumed discrimination for the sake of
argument and made the case that Maryland lacked other options to address gasoline shortages.
Perhaps the Court ignored this line of reasoning because other alternatives were readily
conceivable, thus weakening its conclusion that no discrimination existed.
161. Maine argued that "the [importation] ban legitimately protect[ed] the State's fisheries
from parasites and nonnative species that might be included in shipments of live baitfish."
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reviewed strong evidence of viable alternatives to Maine's importation ban on
live baitfish. 162 Wisconsin required disease-free certifications for shipments
of imported fish.' 63 Tennessee conducted its own inspections of out-of-state
fish.'" Minnesota prohibited use of imported minnows for bait purposes
except as specifically permitted."
Some states "require[d] administrative
approval for the importation and introduction of any live fish," including
Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin, and South Dakota." Several other states, such
as Alabama, North Carolina, and Nevada, granted authority to their fish and
game agencies to prohibit species importation. 67
As an alternative to an importation ban, the First Circuit raised the68
possibility of raising baitfish on bait farms set aside for that species alone.
Maine could have alleviated the problem of introducing exotic species into
169
Maine waters simply by limiting imports to baitfish grown on such farms.
Rather than considering this alternative as less discriminatory than Maine's
importation ban, the Court chose to focus on a specific issue of "whether
scientifically accepted techniques exist for the sampling and inspection of live
baitfish. "170 This failure to analyze fully a feasible alternative to a discriminatory regulation, particularly in the case of an importation ban, is inconsistent
with the analysis and spirit in Hunt.
Having reviewed the Court's inquiry into whether alternatives to
discriminatory regulations exist, we can see that the Court has not been
consistent in the rigor of its analyses. The Court in Hunt quite confidently
raised a series of alternatives to North Carolina's regulation that discriminated
in effect against interstate commerce. In contrast, the Exxon Court was silent
about the question of less restrictive alternatives to a regulation prohibiting
producers or refiners of petroleum products from operating retail service
stations within Maryland. This Subsection has shown that several conceivable
approaches would have furthered the availability of petroleum for all retail
stations in Maryland without discriminating in effect against interstate
commerce. In further contrast, the Taylor Court had evidence of a number of
alternatives short of an importation ban for protecting wild fish. Nonetheless,

Taylor, 477 U.S. at 133.
162. See id. at 151 n.22.
163. See United States v.Taylor, 752 F.2d 757, 762 n.14 (1st Cir. 1985), rev'd sub nom.
Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (citing Wis. STAT. ANN. § 29.535(1)(c) (West Supp.

1984)).
164. Id. at 762 n.15.
165. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 151 n.22.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Taylor, 752 F.2d at 763 n.17 (citation omitted).
169. Id. at 763 n.17.
170. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 146.
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the Court chose to focus on an issue tangential to reasonable alternatives,
namely, "whether scientifically accepted techniques exist for the sampling and
inspection of live baitfish."171 Taken together, these cases show that the
Court has been inconsistent in its search for alternatives to challenged
discriminatory regulations.
Unfortunately, the inconsistency has not been limited to the search for
alternatives to discriminatory regulations. As this section on the modern
caselaw has shown, the modern Court has been inconsistent in applying the
balancing test. While the Court used a deferential standard of review for
highway regulations in Barnwell Bros., it adopted a balancing test that it
applied to later highway cases such as Raymond and Kassel. Neither case has
provided clear guidance on where the line should be drawn between permissible and impermissible state regulation. Raymond hinted that the Court would
be more sympathetic to a state's safety interest under the balancing approach
if more evidence were developed about safety benefits. Iowa learned from
Wisconsin's failure in Raymond to develop a record on the safety issue.
Nonetheless, the Court found Iowa's extensive evidence of safety benefits from
a shorter truck length limit to be lacking.
Thus, the history of the Commerce Clause has been characterized by
unclear decisionmaking. Under the Articles of Confederation, trade wars
among the states produced a consensus that a central government needed the
power to regulate but no clear thinking on where the line should be drawn
between permissible and impermissible state regulation. The Court has
experimented with various formulations, all of which have failed to define a
principled framework for review of regulations. Thus, the jurisprudence
suffers from wrong answers to the wrong questions posed by current doctrine.
III. THE CRITICAL LITERATURE OF THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
This Section summarizes the critical literature generated by the dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence. The section begins with an examination of
scholarship proposing that the Court simply eliminate its role in this area
altogether in the interests of convenience and judicial efficiency. Then, the
section reviews the efforts of other scholars who argue that the jurisprudence
can be made clear with an emphasis on discrimination. The section concludes
that the critical literature has fallen short of defining where the line between
permissible and impermissible state regulation should be drawn.
A. Proposalsfor the Elimination of a JudicialRole
Several constitutional scholars have issued a general call for the Court to

171. Id.
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abandon the dormant Commerce Clause in its current form."if This Subsection shows that these proposals are unconvincing because they fail to solve the
dormancy problem. These scholars assume either that other constitutional
provisions, such as the Privileges and Immunities Clause, can replace the
dormant Commerce Clause or that Congress and administrative agencies will
step into the void created by the judiciary. Both assumptions are questionable.
A better approach for reforming the dormancy doctrine would be to recognize
the important role of the Court.
Proponents of eliminating the Court's role in dormant Commerce Clause
cases have avoided the challenge of making an uncertain dormancy doctrine
more certain in its application. Professor Eule, for example, would replace
judicial review on Commerce Clause grounds by appealing to the term
"citizen" in the Privileges and Immunities Clause." Eule believes we no
longer need a dormancy doctrine as we did in the 1940s when the Court
embraced Dowling's suggestion of balancing national and local interests. 74

In proposing a model for measuring legislative discrimination against
unrepresented interests, Eule bases his argument largely on the definition of
citizenship rights as applied in the Privileges and Immunities Clause.'
Eule's proposal falls short of solving the dormancy problem on several
points. First, Eule fails to address where the line should be drawn between

172. Steven Breker-Cooper, The Commerce Clause: The Casefor JudicialNon-Intervention,
69 OR. L. Rv. 895, 896 (1990) ("I argue that the judiciary should not intervene in regulating
state commercial enactments until and unless Congress acts."); Eule, supra note 14, at 428 ("In
the pages that follow, I proffer a radically diminished role for both the dormant commerce clause
and the Court as its interpreter."); Daniel A. Farber, State Regulation and the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 3 CONST. COMMENTARY 395, 396 (1986) ("This article will argue for a
sharply reduced judicial role in reviewing state regulations under the dormant commerce clause.")
(footnote omitted); Richard D. Friedman, Putting the Dormancy Doctrine Out of Its Misery, 12
CARDOZO L. REv. 1745, 1745 (1991) ("In this essay, I argue that Justice Scalia's instincts are
correct: the dormancy doctrine ought to be abandoned, though not necessarily for the reasons he
suggests."). It should be noted that Farber might no longer hold this position. See Letter from
Daniel A. Farber, Professor of Law, University of Minnesota, to Winkfield F. Twyman, Jr.,
Associate Professor of Law, California Western School of Law 1 (May 9, 1994) (on file with
author).
173. Eule, supra note 14, at 428 ("Indeed, in those instances where judicial intervention
appears warranted, it is only the anachronistic definition of the term 'citizen' in the privileges and
immunities guarantees of Article IV, Section 2 that justifies the preservation of the commerce
clause's negative side at all." (footnote omitted)).
174. See Eule, supra note 14, at 427 n.7, 428. Professor Eule argues that while Dowling's
proposal that the Court balance national and local interests absent congressional legislation was
innovative in 1940, the balancing test now "serves neither as an adequate explanation of the
Court's recent offerings nor as a satisfactory theoretical foundation for a consistent decisional
framework. More important, its raison d'9tre has evaporated." Id. at 427 (footnote omitted).
175. See supranote 173 and accompanyingtext. The Privileges and Immunities Clause reads:
"The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the
several States." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
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permissible and impermissible state regulation. By using judicial review of
citizenship rights as a proxy for a measuring process, 76 Eule avoids altogether the regulation issue. Second, Eule acknowledges that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause does not represent a constitutional tool equal in scope to the
dormant Commerce Clause: "Most serious of its shortcomings is the
antiquated doctrine of Paul v. Virginia, [75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869)] which
excludes corporate entities from the protective arms of the [Privileges and
Immunities] [C]lause. "177 Thus, in his effort to legitimate judicial review
in dormancy doctrine, Eule fails to address the limits of permissible state
regulation.
Even if it could be argued that legitimization of judicial review and the
limits of permissible state regulation are the same inquiry, the Paul v.
Virginia 78 doctrine limits the reach of the privileges and immunities
doctrine to noncorporations. 179 This limitation excludes the use of the
doctrine from most dormancy matters because the vast majority of challenges
to state regulations are brought by corporations and business interests.
Of course, the Court could change its interpretation of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause and extend its protections to corporations, thus overruling
Paul. Several commentators, including Eule, have called for the reversal of
the Paul doctrine because it permits state discrimination contrary to the spirit
of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 8 ' From a practical standpoint,

176. Eule, supra note 14, at 456 ("Silencing the commerce clause's dormant facet will
sharpen our focus, but the task reassigned to the privileges and immunities clause will
nevertheless be formidable. A representation-enforcing approach requires a court to ascertain
whether the mechanisms of participatory democracy have failed to function properly.").
177. Id. at 449 (footnotes omitted).
178. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
179. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 403 n.3 (2d ed. 1988) ("It
should be noted in this regard, however, that the typical beneficiary of the commerce clause's
negative implications is a corporateentity and as such cannot claim the protection of article IV's
privileges and immunities clause." (citations omitted)); JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, THE EVOLVING
CONsTITUTION 409 ("The [Privileges and Immunities] [C]lause encompasses the rights of citizens,
not corporations or other business entities." (endnotes omitted)).
180. Eule, supra note 14, at 450-51 ("This limitation of Article IV's application to natural
persons would render it completely inadequate for the purposes I have suggested."); Douglas

Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equaland TerritorialStates:The ConstitutionalFoundationof Choice
of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 249, 269-70 (1992) ("The omission of corporations from the
Privileges and Immunities Clause is not an element of the constitutional scheme; it is a relic from
a time before general incorporation laws."); Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant
Commerce Clause and the ConstitutionalBalance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569, 610-11
("The Court's failure to extend the protection of the privileges and immunities clause to
corporations presents an obvious practical problem, because of the enormous amount of
commerce that is conducted by corporations."); Jonathan D. Varat, State "Citizenship" and
Interstate Equality, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 487,499 n.47 (1981) ("mhe underlying antidiscrimination objectives of the clause can be thwarted as much by state discrimination against businesses
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however, the Court has shown no inclination to revisit the Paul doctrine.'
Friedman goes well beyond Eule's model by eliminating the dormant
doctrine altogether without expanding the Privileges and Immunities Clause to
replace the present structure. 1 Instead, administrative agencies would fill
the void left by the Court's abandonment of the dormancy doctrine.'
In
Friedman's view, the Court and administrative agencies are interchangeable
when the need exists to invalidate impermissible state regulations. 8 4
Friedman's call for the Court to jettison more than 150 years of judicial
experience and knowledge rejects the advantages of doctrinal evolution such
as stability in the law. "a Moreover, administrative agencies lack the judicial
power of the Court.' 6 Marbury v. Madison"r7 clearly vests the power of

incorporated in other states as by state discrimination against natural persons who make their
homes in other states.").
181. See, e.g., Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 74 n.3 (1982) (O'Connor, J.,concurring)
("It is settled that the Privileges and Immunities Clause does not protect corporations." (citing
Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868))).
182. Friedman states:
I thus go further than does Professor Eule, who argues that the dormancy
doctrine [sic] should be eliminated except to the extent necessary to take up what he
perceives as the slack left by an unduly narrow view of the term "citizens" in the
privileges and immunities clause of article IV, section 2 of the Constitution. . . . By
contrast, I would eliminate the dormancy doctrine altogether, without expanding the
scope of the privileges and immunities clause beyond a narrow prohibition-the
bounds of which I will not attempt to define here-of certain types of discrimination
against individuals.
Friedman, supra note 172, at 1746 n.4 (citing Eule, supra note 14, at 428).
183. Friedman explains:
To prevent any confusion, I will assert right off that I recognize as essential to
our national economy that there be some federal authority ready and able to invalidate
state laws that unacceptably interfere with interstate commerce .... My argument is
simply that this authority should not be judicial. I do not question whether the
authority should exist; I only question who should exercise it. Congress itself can
perform only a small part of the job. Most of the burden, therefore, must be borne
by one or more administrative agencies.
Id. at 1746 (emphasis in original).
184. Seeid. Friedman hints that administrative agencies might do abetter job than the Court
"because the agency would not confront the factors that appropriately inhibit the courts from
unduly interfering with political decisions." Id.
185. By way of contrast, Professor Regan's proposal that the Court should be concerned only
with preventing protectionism in dormant Commerce Clause cases expressly draws upon what the
Court has been doing in this area. See Regan, supra note 8, at 1206 ("But my claim, remember,
is that in the dormant commerce clause area, and most particularly in movement-of-goods cases,
the Court has been doing just what it should do.").
186. See LIEBERMAN, supranote 179, at 280. While federal administrativeagencies may hear
important types of cases, Article III as interpreted by the Court vests the power to declare a law
unconstitutional and the power to review and overturn administrative action in the Court. Id.
Congress may choose to invest administrative agencies with sweeping enforcement powers, thus
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judicial review in the Court."'8 From a judicial standpoint, even the most
aggressive agency can merely hold hearings and assess the penalties expressly
allowed by the statute enacted by Congress authorizing the regulation.18 9 If
adopted, Friedman's proposal would displace the check of judicial review on
state regulation with administrative agency oversight. Friedman fails to
consider whether the imposition of an agency buffer zone between state
lawmaking and judicial review would enhance or deter undue interference with
interstate commerce.' 90
Besides the consequences for state behavior, Friedman's model would
create new incentives for special interest groups to lobby congressional
committees for favors. If trade association X challenges a state regulation and
loses before the administrative agency, the association's strategy might be to
curry favor with members of the respective oversight committees in the United
States Senate and House of Representatives. The trade association could argue
either that the law needs to be changed "to prevent this injustice" or that
counterbalancing language must be inserted into the committee report from
relevant congressional committees to show "true congressional intent."
Alternatively, the association could request that the key staff of congressional
members convene a meeting to question agency heads about general agency
operations. It is not uncommon for regulated interest groups to pursue a
promoting compliance with the Commerce Clause as a practical matter. Id. However, the
ultimate power of review rests in the Court and, in theory, all administrative decisions must
conform with statutory and judicially developed limitations on administrative power. Id.
187. See 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.).
188. Chief Justice John Marshall stated in his opinion:
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound
and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide
on the operation of each.
If, then, the courts are to regard the constitution, and the constitution is superior
to any ordinary act of the legislature, the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must
govern the case to which they both apply.
Id. at 177-78.
189. LIEBERMAN, supra note 179, at 34 ("Congress may provide that violation of a regulation
be punished exactly as if it were an enactment of Congress .... But the penalties must be stated
in the congressional statute authorizing the regulation; the administrative agency may not invent
a new punishment or enlarge one set out in the law." (endnotes omitted)). For an interesting
observation about the power that "independent" administrative agencies wield, see id. at 34-35.
190. Scholars have split over the issue of whether administrative agencies are preferable to
courts in implementing the law. Compare Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding
Legislation Through StatutoryInterpretation:AnInterestGroup Model, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 223,
264 (1986) ("Agency officials, who lack lifetime appointments, are subject to political pressures
from which judges are immune.") with Richard Pierce, InstitutionalAspectsof Tort Reform, 73
CAL. L. REv.917, 936 (1985) (stating that "agencies are more legitimate than courts as a source
of law reform" in the context of tort reform).
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lobbying strategy directed at the membership and staff officials of key
oversight committees.' 9
However, Friedman assumes congressional consideration of state
regulation would produce a better result than judicial review. I think this
assumption is suspect because of the need for litigants to have certainty in the
law. As opposed to political appeals to Congress, judicial review under the
dormant Commerce Clause assures litigants of a focused inquiry: Does

discrimination against interstate commerce exist? Do the benefits to the state
from a regulation outweigh the burden on interstate commerce? Although
imperfect, the focused dormancy doctrine compares favorably with the political
results of a potential iron triangle, "a situation in which the agency, a
powerful constituency with a vested interest in the status quo at the agency,
and a few well-placed legislators beholden to that constituency act together to
block all attempts at change."" 9
The role of the Court as preserver of the national interest in interstate
commerce forms a cornerstone of our post-New Deal Constitution."9 When

191. Along these lines, several commentators have developed capture and iron triangle
theories to explain the symbiotic relationship between regulated industries and regulating
administrative agencies. See, e.g., Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Law in a GlobalEra:
Progress,DeregulatoryChange, and the Rise of the Administrative Presidency, 73 CORNELL L.
REV. 1101, 1130 n.143 (1988) (defining capture as "a neutralization of effective agency
regulatory authority and an undermining of agency innovative ability"); Macey, supra note 190,
at 263 (stating that the capture theory is "a primitive version of the economic theory of regulation
which predicts 'that over time regulatory agencies come to be dominated by the industries
regulated.'" (quoting Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Sending of Statutes and
the Constitution,49 U. CHi. L. REv. 263, 341 (1982))); Pierce, supra note 190, at 935 n. 104
("'Capture' refers to the tendency of some agencies to favor the industry they are required to
regulate by protecting the industry from outside competition and stifling innovation that threatens
the status quo in the industry." (citation omitted)); Pierce, supra note 190, at 935 n.105 ("The
'iron triangle' refers to the combination of direct beneficiaries of a regulatory program,
bureaucrats who run the program, and legislators with oversight responsibility for the program,
This combination often develops a shared interest in maintaining the status quo of a program's
function." (citation omitted)). It should be noted that the capture theory and other public choice
models have had difficulty in explaining the rise of consumer and environmental protection
regulation. See generallyChristopher H. Schroeder, Rights Against Risks, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
495 (1986).
192. Pierce, supra note 190, at 934 (footnote omitted).
193. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 669 (1981) ("When
a State ventures excessively into the regulation of these aspects of commerce, it 'trespasses upon
national interests, and the courts will hold the state regulation invalid under the [Commerce]
Clause alone." (citation omitted) (quoting Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366,
373 (1976)); Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 454 (1979) ("But it long
has been 'accepted constitutional doctrine that the commerce clause ... affords some protection
from state legislation inimical to the national commerce, and that in such cases, where Congress
has not acted, this Court, and not the state legislature, is under the commerce clause the final
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Congress has failed to regulate commerce among the several states, the Court
has applied various structures to guard against undue interference with
interstate commerce."9 If Friedman's model is adopted, administrative
agencies simply could not muster the credibility and respect of the Court in
safeguarding the national interest." 9
Professor Breker-Cooper also argues that the Court should not hear
commercial cases because of congressional power to preempt state law and
Court decisions in this area. 96 He believes that unless Congress acts, the
states should be free to regulate commerce in any way they choose."
Breker-Cooper concludes that the Court, not the states, are precluded from
action in this area. 9 ' While "[c]urrent dormant commerce clause jurisprudence is extremely unsatisfactory""9 and abandonment of the doctrine might
increase democratic accountability, Breker-Cooper shares with Friedman an
unwarranted faith in political responses from Congress. That Congress has
"the political will to act when necessary"' does not find suipport in the
congressional response to the federal budget deficit, the savings and loan
scandal, or the health care crisis. Because Congress lacks the political will to
regulate commerce, the Court has developed a series of judicially imposed
limitations on state regulations to ward off undue interference with interstate
commerce.
The best examples of political will are those limited instances in which
Congress has overruled Supreme Court decisions.70 But these decisions

arbiter .... .'" (quoting Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 769
(1945)); Howard 0. Hunter, Federalismand State Taxation ofMultistateEnterprises,32 EMORY
L.J. 89, 99 (1983) ("Unless Congress does more, courts will have to rely on the restraining
power of the dormant Commerce Clause to determine the permissible extent of state taxation.
A federal court must decide whether a particular state tax effectively undermines the national
economic unit."); Redish & Nugent, supra note 180, at 581 n.76 ("'[I]n general Congress has
left it to the courts to formulate the rules thus interpreting the commerce clause in its application,
doubtless because it has appreciated the destructive consequences to the commerce of the nation
if their protection were withdrawn ... .'") (quoting Southern Pac., 325 U.S. at 770) (alteration
in original) (omission in original); John R. Sagan, Note, Severance Taxes and the Commerce
Clause: Commonwealth Edison v. Montana, 1983 Wis. L. REv. 427, 436 (1983).
194. See discussion supra parts II.B.1, II.B.2.
195. But see Farber, supra note 172, at 407 ("Like the court, the agency speaks for the
national interest as against parochial local interests.").
196. See Breker-Cooper, supra note 171, at 896.
197. See id.

198. See id. at 949.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Breker-Cooper has compiled a tally of several Supreme Court decisions overruled by
Congress. After Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518
(1852), "Congress for the first time changed the outcome of a Court decision which was based
on the dormant commerce clause." Breker-Cooper, supra note 172, at 931. Congress also
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represent atypical overrulings of court decisions and thus represent fundamental congressional inertia. Congress can respond in one of three ways to
interstate commerce: (1) it can regulate interstate commerce, in which case
there is no dormant Commerce Clause issue; (2) it can do nothing, in which
case there is the classic dormant Commerce Clause dilemma; or (3) it can
overrule a Court ruling due to the prevailing political will. As a general rule,
congressional inaction means the political will did not exist to regulate
commerce before or after a Court ruling. How removing the Court from the
dynamic altogether might generate political will when Congress has failed to
regulate commerce in the past cannot be answered with a faith that Congress
will find the political will to act when necessary. Once a judicial check has
been removed, more states will thus have an incentive to interfere with
interstate commerce.) °
Does this reasoning suggest that the Court is nothing more than a proxy
for congressional regulation?'
Breker-Cooper shares the widely held
notion "that the Court is using the dormant commerce clause to effectuate the
unexpressed intention of Congress."'
If we assume the various structures
of review communicate the unarticulated intention of Congress, then a proxy
argument makes sense. Congress, however, has neither decided that all state
regulations are permissible unless they impermissibly burden interstate
commerce nor that all state regulations are permissible unless they discriminate
against interstate commerce with certain limited exceptions.'
Thus, the
judicially developed limitations cannot be squared with congressional intent.
Breker-Cooper also does not fully explain why his proposal "would lead
to increased certainty for state legislatures.""
One can imagine a torrent
of "independent" discriminatory regulations 7 forcing states to maintain
constant vigilance against protectionist attacks by neighboring states. Under

overruled the Court after Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890); Bowman v. Chicago &
Northwestern Railway, 125 U.S. 465 (1888); and United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). Breker-Cooper, supra note 172, at 931-34.
202. Of course, the risk of state interference could force Congress to speak but this hope
requires a faith in political will as well.
203. Eule makes this argument as historical justification for the dormant Commerce Clause,
although he believes thatCongress can now fend for itself and that the dormant Commerce Clause
should be discarded. See Eule, supra note 14, at 431-32, 435.
204. Breker-Cooper, supra note 172, at 906.
205. Congress, of course, has the power to allow state interference with interstate commerce.
See, e.g., id. at 934 ("The McCarran-Ferguson Act was held to allow South Carolina to impose
a tax on out-of-state insurance companies that arguably would have violated the commerce clause,
because the tax discriminated in favor of in-state companies.") (footnote omitted).
206. Breker-Cooper, supra note 172, at 919.
207. Professor Collins uses this term to describe state laws that discriminate against interstate
commerce irrespective of other state laws. See Richard B. Collins, JusticeScaliaand the Elusive
Idea of DiscriminationAgainst Interstate Commerce, 20 N.M. L. Rv. 555, 556 (1990).
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the Breker-Cooper model, states would have no recourse to the judicial branch
for an analysis of whether interstate commerce had been unduly disrupted. A
state's only recourse would be to the highly politicized arena of Congress, and
its chances of success would depend upon whether the state's congressional
delegation wielded influence. This scenario produces less certainty, not more.
In general, abandonment scholarship fails to provide structure to guide a
state's lawmakers. Scholars assume the absence of the dormant Commerce
Clause would mean more order than continued reliance on it. However, the
absence of a well-developed structure to replace the dormancy structure would
undermine any enhanced order. Farber's proposal that the dormancy law be
considered inoperative because of the preemption powers Congress can assign
to administrative agencies illustrates the point:20 8 Assume Congress has
delegated preemption power to judge state laws to administrative agencies,
thus displacing the Court as the decisionmaker. Farber argues that such an
agency (which I will label the Dormant Commerce Commission (DCC)) would
be a superior decisionmaker for reviewing state regulations because of its
expertise. 9 Farber gives no working definition for "expertise" in this
context. Although the reader may assume expertise means superior knowledge
about railroads, interstate trucking, and the like, a more important expertise
is institutional memory. For more than 150 years, the Court has grappled
with various structures for reviewing state regulations. While the jurisprudence has not been ordered, it has worked in the sense that Congress seldom
has intervened to overrule dormant Commerce Clause decisions.210 Clearly,
the Court has developed a sense of what results Congress will tolerate and
what results will prompt the rare political will for Congress to take some
action. Defining expertise in this fashion, the Court brings more knowledge
and experience to the review of regulations.
Farber also argues that an administrative agency has a superior ability to
gather information because the agency can finance new investigations to
increase its knowledge.
While appealing in theory, the DCC would serve
watchful political masters on the U.S. Senate and House Appropriations
Committees.212 These committees would control the purse strings for our

208. See Farber, supra note 172, at 396. Farber also explains that some propose "that courts
invalidate only laws that intentionally discriminate against interstate commerce." Id. For the sake
of clarity, I discuss the discrimination element to Farber's proposal in section III.B.
209. Id. at 407.
210. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
211. Farber, supra note 172 at 407.
212. See HEDRICK SMITH, THE POWER GAME: How WASHINGTON WORKS 167 (1988). For
example, after the head of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) declared that the administration had understated the Pentagon's actual spending by $14.7 billion, Senator Ted Stevens of
Alaska, "the hawkish chairman ofthe Defense Appropriations Subcommittee," raged at the CBO
head with threats to cut their budget if CBO did not change their estimates on the Pentagon:

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

37

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 2
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:381

hypothetical DCC. Accordingly, commercial interests unhappy with DCC
decisions could always lobby committee members and their staffs during

debates over DCC appropriations. Real political limits exist on the ability of
agencies to finance investigations of a controversial nature, constraints that

courts do not face.21 3

Abandonment will not solve the dormancy problem. Scholars assume that
other constitutional provisions like the Privileges and Immunities Clause can
take up the slack or that Congress or administrative agencies will step into the
void. Both assumptions are questionable. A better approach recognizes the
important role of the Court.
B. Proposalsfor a Modified DiscriminationAnalysis
As discussed earlier,21 4 the modem Court has developed an alternative
approach to the balancing test: determining whether a regulation discriminates
against interstate commerce. 215 Once the Court identifies discrimination
against interstate commerce, the burden falls on the state to justify the

discrimination. 216 The state must justify such discrimination in terms of the
local benefits flowing from the statute and the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to preserve the local interests at stake. 21 7 The
burden of justification for the state is high because the state cannot rely upon
mere professions of a legitimate objective.2 8
Discrimination parallels the disruptive environment that flourished under
the Articles of Confederation.2 9 States erected trade barriers against one
Assuming that
another at will without fear of federal intervention.m

"That really rocks this defense bill... I am going to cut your money. You cannot put me in this
position." Id. at 291 (endnote omitted). It should be noted that the Congressional Budget Office
stood its ground, however. Id.
213. But see STONE, ET AL., CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1991) (the Court is subject to
external political control including constitutional amendment, the power to appoint and
impeachment).
214. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
215. See supra note 99.
216. See cases cited supra note 99.
217. See cases cited supra note 100.
218. See cases cited supra note 101. The state must satisfy two criteria: that local benefits
flow from the statute and that no nondiscriminatory alternatives are adequate for preserving the
local interests at stake. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 15-21 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 15-21 and accompanying text; see also Regan, supra note 8, at 1114
("The people who wrote our actual Constitution in 1787 were well aware of this danger. They
saw states enacting protectionistrestrictions; they saw other states retaliating; and they feared not
merely for the economic health, but also and even more for the political viability of the infant
United States."); see also RobertN. Clinton,A BriefHistoryof the Adoption of the United States
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discrimination is what the dormant Commerce Clause inquiry should be about,
the more difficult issues are deciding upon the appropriate manner and
objective of doctrinal reform.
In an exhaustive examination of purposeful protectionism, Professor
Regan argues that the Court "should be concerned only with preventing
purposeful protectionism."" 1 A state regulation should be unconstitutional
if the law flows from a protectionist purpose "to advantage local actors at the
expense of their foreign competitors."'
In defining a regulation as protectionist, Regan adopts the following twopart framework: examine whether (a) a given regulation is adopted for the

purpose of improving the competitive position of local (in-state) economic
actors just because they are local and (b) the regulation is analogous in form
to the traditional instruments of protectionism-the tariff, the quota, or the
outright embargo.'
While Regan's model sets up a splendid approach for reforming the
discrimination rule, purposeful protectionism fails to remedy the discriminatory effect problem. Linked to the historical roots of the dormant Commerce
Clause, antiprotectionism can inform review of regulations by the Court. But
Regan's antiprotectionism is a preliminary sketch of an effective reform.
Regan wrongly assumes the Court has been concerned exclusively with
preventing states from engaging in purposeful economic protectionism. In

Constitution,75 IOWA L. REv. 891, 894 (1990) ("In reality foreign governments... declined
to enter into commercial treaties with the United States because of the inability of Congress to
control the commercial policies of the several states. Thus, Britain ... closed the lucrative West
Indies to American trade and discriminated against American vessels in Britain ports."); Max
Farrand, The Federal Constitutionand the Defects of the Confederation, 2 American Political
Science Review, 532, 535 (1908) (noting that members of the federal convention identified state
trespass upon the rights of other states as a defect of the Confederation and suggested "the central
government should be given the right and power of coercion, with a negative, or some check
upon State legislation.").
221. Regan, supra note 8, at 1093. Regan's definition of purposeful protectionism is
somewhat imprecise. In his article, Regan argues "that a state statute ... is protectionist if and
only if:
(a) the statute ... was adopted for the purpose of improving the competitive position of
local (in-state) economic actors, just because they are local, vis-h-vis their foreign (by which I
mean simply out-of-state) competitors. . . ." Id. at 1094-95. Regan later observes that " [t]here
is no useful distinction to be made between motive and purpose in the present context." Id. at
1143. It is not clear whether Regan understands the "purpose" in purposeful protectionism to
mean legislation motivated by a protectionist purpose, legislation whose "object is to improve the
competitive position of local economic actors, just because they are local," id. at 1126, legislation
having "the unvarnished intention of taking something away from other states just to enjoy it at
home," id. at 1126 (footnote omitted), legislation with a protectionist aim, id. at 1130-31, 1147,
or legislation enacted for protectionist reasons, id. at 1148.
222. Id. at 1095 (emphasis in original).
223. Id. at 1094-95.
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fact, the Court has been concerned with discrimination in effect as well. 4
The Court recognizes that failure to account for discrimination in effect gives
inadequate protection against undue interference with interstate commerce.2
Regan also draws a false line between "movement-of-goods" and other
state regulation cases. Similar to the discredited direct-indirect effects
test,' this labeling maneuver finds little support in the text of the Constitution. The Constitution addresses regulation of commerce among the several
states, not the regulation of "movement-of-goods" among the several
states. 7 Lacking textual and historical support, the "movement of goods"
label oversimplifies the difficult inquiry whether a regulation should be
permissible under the dormant Commerce Clause. 28
Even if we assume that the dormant Commerce Clause addresses
"movement-of-goods" cases, Regan's proposal fails to confront the dilemma
of discrimination in effect. Discrimination in effect can be just as disruptive

224. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978); Hunt v.
Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350-52 (1977); Dean Milk Co. v.
City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951).
225. See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
226. For roughly thirty years around the turn of this century, the Court would ask whether
a regulation imposed "direct" or "indirect" effects on interstate commerce, the former being held
invalid and the latter valid. Dowling, supra note 1, at 6. The Court began to rely upon these
labels because the Cooley terminology ("national" and "local") left unanswered many questions
about the distinction between permissible and impermissible state regulation. Id.
Unfortunately for the Court, the short-lived reliance on direct and indirect effects did not
succeed in defining a line between permissible and impermissible state regulation. The test
offered little guidance for deciding how a case should be labeled. Id. Quarantine laws surely
would be defined as direct, yet the Court upheld quarantines. Id. The only certain consequence
of direct and indirect effects test became uncertain application.
227. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (providing that Congress shall have the power "to
regulate Commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian
tribes"). Rather than define commerce in a narrow sense, Chief Justice Marshall understood the
"buying and selling" of goods as constituting a mere subset of a broader "commercial
intercourse":
It has, we believe, been universally admitted, that [the commerce power] comprehend[s] every species of commercial intercourse between the United States and
foreign nations. No sort of trade can be carried on between this country and any
other, to which this power does not extend .... If this be the admitted meaning of
the word, in its application to foreign nations, it must carry the same meaning
throughout the sentence [as applied to commerce among the several states].
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 193-94 (1824).
228. Regan's focus on "movement-of-goods" cases is also problematic because transportation
cases do a better job of illustrating the uncertainty of dormancy doctrine. If we assume reform
is needed because of doctrinal disorder, transportation cases are more revealing than movementof-goods cases. See supra notes 65-102 and accompanying text. While Regan believes the Court
should treat transportation and movement-of-goods cases differently, see Regan, supra note 8,
at 1182-92, this article provides a single doctrinal framework for state regulation of all
commercial activity.
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to interstate commerce and more difficult to prevent. Whether addressed in
Bibb v. Navajo FreightLines, Inc. 2 9 or Huron PortlandCement Co. v. City
of Detroit,3 discrimination is a concern in reviewing regulations. Regan's
model fails to recognize the real challenges posed by regulatory interference
with interstate commerce when the regulation lacks purposeful protectionism.
His model values the label of purposeful discrimination3while glossing over the
real effects of interference with interstate commerce.2 1
Professor Tushnet has developed a competing discrimination model based
on political process."
The inquiry begins with an examination of the
adequacy of the legislative process. 3 In other words, has the legislative
process been distorted to the disadvantage of excluded interests affected by a
regulation?"3 In the case of a distorted process, Tushnet argues that judicial
intervention should take the form of substantive due process in economic
cases. 35 Every legislature should consider efficiency when drafting economic regulations and, in Tushnet's judgment, substantive due process is the best
response to that objective.

36

While I am sympathetic to Tushnet's focus on discrimination in economic
cases, he does not expand upon whether his model is equally suited for review
of state police regulations, particularly safety regulations. The Court has
accorded safety regulations a traditional deference, a deference not evident in
economic cases.

237

Even if we assume that safety cases can be reviewed like economic cases
under Tushnet's analysis, why should distortion of the political process be
central to the inquiry? Out-of-state commercial interests that employ political
action committees and government relations staffs often have far more

229. 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
230. 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
231. See Rethinking, supra note 14, at 133 ("Few statutes 'artlessly disclose... an avowed
purpose to discriminate against interstate goods,' though some do, and dormant commerce clause
doctrine would have little impact were it confined to a ban on avowedly purposeful discrimination."). For an interesting discussion about the consequences of a discriminatory intent standard
in the context of equal protection doctrine, see Farber, supra note 172, at 403-05.
232. While Tushnet does not subscribe to a process-based theory of judicial review, his
discussion provides a coherent way of understanding the dormant Commerce Clause from the
standpoint of excluded political interests. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 40; Mark Tushnet,
Community and Fairnessin DemocraticTheory, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 417, 418-20 (1987).
233. Rethinking, supra note 14, at 125.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. For general support of this proposition, see Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450
U.S. 662 (1981); Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978). But see, e.g.,
Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761
(1945).
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influence on the legislative process than constituents. Perhaps judicial
intervention might be warranted for other reasons. However, the sustaining
reason for jidicial review should not flow from the premise that "local
legislatures are unlikely to take into account the effects of their laws on out-ofstate interests. "18
Unless the measure regulates "hot-button" topics like abortion or hatespeech, local individual constituents will be silent in the halls of the legislature
when commercial regulation comes up for committee and floor votes. Far
more visible will be representatives and lobbyists for monied interests, whether
those interests be in-state or out-of-state. z 9 The focus on defects in the
political process provides a false basis on which to justify review of state
regulation. The Commerce Clause involves "commerce," not "process."
Furthermore, even if we accept the process-based justification for judicial
intervention, Tushnet's notion of substantive due process has proven
inadequate and unsatisfactory for constitutional adjudication in the past. 2 °

238. Rethinking, supra note 14, at 150.
239. For commentary on the visibility of monied interests in state government, see generally
Special Interests Give Almost $1M to Election Campaigns, GNS, August 9, 1993, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, GNS File; Scott Greenberger, The Sleaze in the Statehouses:Inadequate
State CampaignFinanceLane, WASH. MONTHLY, April 1993, at 39. ("Illinois Bell, which stood
to make hundreds of millions of dollars if a 1992 bill lifting the cap off what local telephone
companies could charge customers passed, spent at least $1.9 million in campaign contributions
and lobbying costs."); Donald P. Baker & Thomas Heath, Va. Lawmakers Concede Money May
Buy Access, not Influence, THE WASH. POST, March 5, 1990, at El. Republican Delegate
Clinton Miller said of the advantage of monied interests:
'When push comes to shove, you are more inclined to go with' those who have given
you money. . . . 'If you have six hours' to listen to someone 'and the League of
Women Voters or the ACLU [who don't make campaign contributions] want four
hours of your time, and so do the service station dealers [who gave him money], who
do yoti think will get four hours?'
Id. For a general description of how the constituency process is slanted in favor of wealthy
interests at the federal level, see PHILIP M. STERN, THE BEST CONGRESS MONEY CAN BUY
(1988) and SMITH, supra note 212, at 20-41, 215-70.
240. Tushnet's use of substantivedue process is limited to the review of economic regulations.
Obviously, substantive due process in the context of privacy and the Bill of Rights has received
widespread acceptance and forms a foundation of modem constitutional law. See LIEBERMAN,
supra note 179, at 517 (observing that Justice Douglas, a sworn enemy of economic substantive
due process, revived substantive due process in the context of privacy with the Griswold v.
Connecticutdecision which announced a fundamental right to privacy); RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 361 (4th ed., 1993) (stating that "[The Court has] used the
[Due Process] [Clause to incorporate some, but not all, also of the substantive limitations of the
Bill of Rights, and to apply those limitations to the state by virtue of the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment."); TRIBE, supra note 179, § 11-3, at 777. Tribe notes that [bly
1973, however,
Justice Stewart had 'accepted' Griswold 'as one in a long line of... cases decided
under the doctrine of substantive due process,' and indeed all nine of the Justices as
of 1973 had accepted the Court's role in giving the fourteenth amendment due process
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Classic hornbook law defines economic substantive due process as a test of the
reasonableness of a statute in relation to the government's power to enact such
Under substantive due process, the Court reviewed the
legislation."4
legitimacy of governmental acts without clear guidelines in the text of the
Constitution, thus either raising the Lochner 2 era problem of the Justices
acting like a "super legislature"243 or the post-Lochner era problem of
"anything goes."'
From 1890 to 1937, the Justices employed substantive due process to
invalidate any social welfare or economic legislation with which a majority of
the Court disagreed.245 This approach eventually broke down because the
Justices could not articulate objective criteria for their decisions. 6 Tushnet
fails to explain why the modem Court would be more successful in wielding
7
the sword of substantive due process to review economic regulations.
clause substantive content beyond the Bill of Rights, despite significantdisagreements
over exactly how the role should be performed.
TRME, supra note 179, § 11-3, at 777.
241. ROTUNDA, supra note 240, at 346 (quoting Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)).
By the end of the New Deal, the Court had abandoned a strict review of regulations for
reasonableness and reached a modem conclusionthat "anything goes." SeeRethinking, supra note
14, at 148 ("[Ifn the substantive due process area, standards of reasonableness are so loose that
the test of reasonableness is satisfied by almost any law."); TRINE, supra note 179, § 8-3 at 568
(noting that "[i]n reviewing state and federal economic regulation, the Supreme Court closely
scrutinized both the ends sought and the means employed in challenged legislation. In its analysis
of legislative means, the Court required a 'real and substantial' relationship between a statute and
its objectives").
242. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
243. Dennis J. Coyle, TakingsJurisprudenceand the PoliticalCultures ofAmerican Politics,
42 CATH. U. L. REv. 817, 825 n.53 (1993) ("Wrote Justice Douglas [in Griswold]: 'some
arguments suggest that Lochner v. New York should be our guide. But we decline that invitation
We do not sit as a super-legislature. . . .' [citations omitted]."); Francis S. Chlapowski,
....
ConstitutionalProtectionofInfonnationalPrivacy, 71 B.U. L. REv. 133, 138 (1991)
The
Note,
("ITihe Court cannot sit as a super-legislature and in effect regulate, by striking down the laws
of the elected legislature based on some arbitrary conception of 'liberty.'").
244. See Rethinking, supra note 14, at 148.
245. See generally ROTUNDA, supra note 240, at 355-59. In his dissent in Lochner, Justice
Holmes reasoned that the Founding Fathers created a Constitution "for people of fundamentally
differing views," and the Court should not void a law simply because a legislature enacted the
measure to implement an economic policy the Justices do not believe. ROTUNDA, supra note 240,
at 363.
246. See generally TRIBE, supra note 179, § 8-6 at 578-81.
247. Tushnet acknowledges "that open adherence to substantive due process review in
economic cases is [not] free of risk." Rethinking, supra note 14, at 149. But he attempts to
balance the risk with the benefit of added clarity: "A unified doctrine of enhanced due process
would make it clear that the states can experiment, but not too much. And clarity is a virtue that
cannot be valued too much in constitutional law." Id. at 150. Ultimately, Tushnet is unpersuasive
because he fails to draw a clear line between permissible and impermissible state experimentation
under substantive due process.
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Professor Collins offers an interesting twist on the discrimination debate
by avoiding the intent and effects distinction and the political process concern
altogether. Collins proposes that the Court recognize the difference between
state laws discriminating against interstate commerce without regard to the
laws of other states (independent discrimination) and those laws burdening
commerce only when other states' laws are taken into account (dependent
discrimination).24 Collins urges the Court to adopt a formalist approach to
all state actions in interstate commerce by asking whether independent or
dependent discrimination exists.
If a state regulation discriminates independently against interstate
commerce, then the Court should presume the measure invalid.249 Collins
suggests that this working definition produces a much-needed consistency
because it would produce "a workable rule capable of predictable application
by state officials and lower courts."25 On the other hand, a state regulation
that involves dependent discrimination should be judged by "effects on
commerce in transit through the state and the state's justification.""' Not
surprisingly, these formalist categories offer the illusion of fine-line distinctions without meaningful clarity in practice.
If they were adopted, how should the Court label a state regulation that
discriminates against interstate commerce only when other states' laws are
taken into account? The North Carolina regulation in Hunt lacked facial
discrimination but produced discriminatory effects once the Washington state
laws were taken into account. The problem not adequately addressed by
Collins is whether a regulation should be presumed invalid if purposeful
discrimination were evident in the legislature's motive or intent. Under
Collins' model, the validity of the North Carolina regulation would turn "on
factors other than discrimination. " 1 2 This approach seems unsound as a
device for rooting out protectionism in whatever form it might take.
Assume the Court reviews a regulation that burdens commerce irrespective of whether other states' laws are taken into account. All state regulations
must burden interstate commerce to some extent unless all states have adopted
similar, uniform regulations. Suppose State X adopts a law against radar
detectors pursuant to its state police powers. All other neighboring states
decline to adopt a similar regulation. In theory, there must exist some
detectable, incidental effect on interstate commerce because speeding motorists
do not travel through State X.23
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
merce."

Collins, supra note 207, at 555-56.
Id. at 556.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Supreme Court decisions suggest that few, if any, activities do not constitute "comSee generally Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (holding that individual
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Under Collins' proposal, this regulation would be upheld by the Court
from a discrimination standpoint. Collins acknowledges that "[m]any state
laws have collateral effects on their neighbors, and most of them are not
suspect on that account alone. " " Collins fails, however, to identify in his
model what criteria are sufficient to distinguish between dependent discrimination in the radar detector hypothetical and dependent discrimination in Hunt,
which in effect prohibited Washington from marketing and selling its apples
in North Carolina. Should dependent discrimination that has the effect of the
most protectionist independent discrimination be suspect on that account alone?
While Collins argues that many more states' laws will fall "[i]f the same
presumption is mindlessly extended to dependent discrimination,"1 5 he fails
to recognize that justification might exist for such an expansion if dependent
discrimination produces the same effect as independent discrimination.
Otherwise, the labels will not match up with the real discriminatory effects on
interstate commerce. The question should be whether the Court can draw a
clear line between permissible and impermissible regulation. Collins offers
false clarity, because dependent discrimination can disrupt interstate commerce
as much as independent discrimination. Artful drafting of neutral regulations
should not be rewarded with more protection from the Court if these
regulations result in discrimination that proves disruptive in effect.
Professor Farber calls for judicial intervention only where an intent to
discriminate against interstate commerce can be proved.2 6 Farber aims not
so much to prevent purposeful discrimination as to protect interstate businesses
from intentional discrimination. The distinction is noteworthy because
intentional discrimination gleaned from a formal legislative history might not
reveal underlying discriminatory motives at work. 7 For example, suppose

loansharking of a purely intrastate nature constitutes interstate commerce); Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111 (1942) (finding that wheat for home consumption has sufficient effects on interstate
commerce in the aggregate to constitute "commerce" under the Commerce Clause).
254. Collins, supra note 207, at 576.
255. Id. at 583.
256. See supra note 208.
257. For one of the best illustrations of the practical distinction between legislative intent and
legislative motive, see Jonathan R. Macey, Special Interest Groups Legislationand the Judicial
Function: The Dilemma of Glass-Steagall, 33 EMORY L.J. 1 (1984). Macey examines the
legislative history behind the Glass-Steagall Act to demonstrate how the formal intentions
articulated in the statute do not survive strict scrutiny. "Itis from analysis of this history that
the gulf between the ostensible legislative intent and the actual legislative motive underlying the
Act becomes clear." Id. at 11. After a comprehensive critique of the formal intentions
articulated in the statute and a review of the special interest group pressure brought to bear on
Congress, id. at 15-21, Macey concludes that legislative motive best explains enactment of the
statute: "Justice Harlan's dissent in Camp ignores the important distinction in statutory analysis
between legislative motive and legislative intent." Id. at 20-21. Macey also quotes Judge
Posner: "Courts look to the language of the statute, to the legislative history and to other
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State X decides to raise the construction and safety standards for modular
housing, and the legislative history cites consumer complaints and safety
hazards in explaining the legislative intent behind the measure. Suppose further
that the rate of consumer complaints about modular housing is below the
national average and that State X ranks in the top ten states nationwide with
respect to its safety record. Industry experts suggest that the new standards
would have a nominal impact on the state's national rankings. Within State
X, the struggling modular housing industry has lobbied members of the state
legislature for tighter construction and safety standards, which are already met
by the domestic manufacturers. Ninety-five percent of out-of-state firms,
however, would be unable to meet these new standards without heavy capital
investment. Most members of the legislature have received financial
contributions from the domestic industry.
Farber's model provides no answer to the dilemma of discriminatory
motive posed above. Although Farber argues that "racial discrimination need
not be evident on the face of [a] statute . . . and the same rules could be
applied in the commerce clause context"," he fails to identify in his
argument what criteria are sufficient to distinguish discriminatory intent from
the discriminatory motive in Dean Milk Co. that the Court deemed impermissi9
ble. 2
Even if good intent or bad motive discrimination should be immunized
from judicial review, then it is necessary to acknowledge and draw a
meaningful distinction between discriminatory intent and discriminatory
motive, but Farber fails to do this. Normally, the Court will not inquire into
the motives of legislators in determining the constitutionality of a regulation.2 ' This rule of law has served an invaluable purpose: keeping the

evidence of legislative intent, but they do not speculate on the motives of the legislators in
enacting the statute." Id. at 21 (quoting Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the
Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. Rv. 263, 272 (1982)).
258. Farber, supra note 172, at 405. As my introduction suggests, I disagree with Farber's
conclusion. I think the analogy between the Equal Protection Clause and the dormant Commerce
Clause misreads commerce as civil rights. Civil rights influences the post-Civil War Constitution
in a manner unlike the protection of commerce. See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177
(1941) (Douglas, J., concurring) (urging the Court to distinguish as a constitutional value civil
rights from mere protection of commerce).
259. See infra notes 317-319. See also City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617,
626 (1978); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977).
260. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); Barenblatt v. United States, 360
U.S. 109 (1959); Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87 (1810). But see Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S.
38, 56 (1985); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 617 (1982); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
242 (1976). Even if courts wanted to inquire, they might not be able to. But see William H.
Page, InterestGroups,Antitrust, and State Regulation:Parker v. Brown in the Economic Theory
of Legislation, 1987 DuKE L.J. 618, 647 ("State legislative histories, such as committee reports
and floor debates, are rarely maintained. Still less common are records of municipal and
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Court out of the arena of problematic inquiries into legislators' personal
motives.2 1
The "flip-side" of the argument reflects the inherent tension between
discriminatory intent and discriminatory motive. If the Court cares about
discriminatory intent and nothing else, how should a bad faith Dean Milk Co.
legislature respond? Under a discriminatory intent standard, a legislature
could either give up its discriminatory intent and join the union of free-tradeloving states or the legislature could artfully conceal a purpose to discriminate
against interstate goods. Assuming the hypothetical Dean Milk Co. legislature
gives up its discriminatory intent, then Farber's model has successfully altered
legislative behavior away from discrimination.
Yet, Farber's model cannot prevent a Dean Milk Co. legislature from
making a bad choice. If, as Justice Clark feared, the legislature chooses to
conceal its discriminatory purpose, a judicial search for intentional discrimination against interstate commerce will turn up nothing and the discriminatory
regulation will be upheld.262 The model thus breaks down over time because
a review for intent alone cannot protect interstate businesses from discrimination against interstate commerce as more and more states become wise to the
Dean Milk Co. loophole.
The Court itself has recognized the inadequacy of a narrow standard based
on intent to discriminate.263 The Court senses that such a standard alone will

administrativedeliberation."); William M. Schrier, Note, The Guardianorthe Ward: ForWhom
Does the Statute Toll?, 71 B.U. L. REv. 575,578 n.23 (1991) ("[M]ost statutes do not explicitly
state the underlying legislative intent and ... published state legislative histories are usually
unavailable."); Elizabeth A. McNellie, Note, The Use of ExtrinsicAids in the Interpretationof
PopularlyEnactedLegislation, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 164 n.46 (1989) ("In California, the
courts have access to occasionally recorded committee hearings, sponsors' statements or memos
prepared by legislative counsel, and records of all amendments. Debates are not recorded.").
261. See LIEBERMAN, supra note 179, at 335.
262. Dean Milk Co., 340 U.S. at 354.
263. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 136-50 (1978) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). There Justice Blackmun wrote that
The State or local authority need not intend to discriminate in order to offend the
policy of maintaining a free-flowing national economy. As demonstrated in Hunt, a
statute that on its face restricts both intrastate and interstate transactions may violate
the Clause by having the 'practical effect' of discriminating in its operation ....
("To begin with, the fact that no discrimination was intended is irrelevant where, as
here, discriminatory effects result from the statutory scheme.")
Id.; see also Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 352-53 (1977)
("[W]e need not ascribe an economic protection motive to the [legislature] to resolve this case;
we conclude that the challenged statute cannot stand insofar as it prohibits the display of
Washington State grades even if enacted for the declared purpose of protecting consumers from
deception and fraud in the marketplace."); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S.
456, 476 n.2 (1981) ("Under the Commerce Clause, a court is empowered to disregard a
legislature's statement of purpose if it considers it a pretext.").
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not prevent discrimination against interstate commerce. A framework for
reforming discrimination doctrine must build upon both the Regan and Farber
approaches and complete the necessary inquiry by the Court by addressing the
issue of discrimination in effect.
Professor Earl M. Maltz begins to provide an answer in his treatment of
"[t]he question of how much state regulation of interstate commerce is too
much . .."
Maltz believes the Commerce Clause should be interpreted
as banning two types of state regulations: (1) those that facially discriminate
"against out-of-state consumers or producers" and (2) those that, "while
facially neutral, [are] intended to protect local industry from outside competition. "'2 Maltz's approach is appealing because, while a basic intuition that
some types of state regulation are simply "too much" pervades the caselaw,
the Court has not been clear in drawing a line between what is permissible and
what is impermissible.'
Maltz's argument emphasizes the importance of free trade values:
business persons should be able to locate freely in any state and should have
access to resources and markets throughout the United States.267 Moreover,
buyers should not be disadvantaged because of their "state of origin" in
acquiring goods produced throughout the states.26 Illustrating the principle
that state boundaries should not impede the movement of goods, Maltz chooses
Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews269 as his paradigm. In that
case, Florida required a local milk distributor to buy milk from in-state
producers and pay an above-market price per gallon for it.270 The law
effectively prevented out-of-state dairy farmers from selling to in-state milk
264. Maltz, supra note 74, at 47.
265. Id. at 67.
266. Exxon Corp., 437 U.S. at 136 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) ("As demonstrated in Hunt, a statute that on its face restricts both intrastate and interstate
transactions may violate the Clause by having the 'practical effect' of discriminating in its
operation."); City of Philadelphiav. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623 (1978) ("The bounds of [the
Commerce Clause's] restraints appear nowhere in the words of the Commerce Clause, but have
emerged gradually in the decisions of this Court giving effect to its basic purpose.") (citation
omitted); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443-444 (1960) (stating
that while states may legislate on subjects touching on "health, life, and safety of their citizens"
and indirectly affect commerce in the process, "a state may not impose a burden which materially
affects interstate commerce in an area where uniformity of regulation is necessary.") (citations
omitted); Dean Milk Co., 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951) (explaining that "even in the exercise of its
unquestioned power to protect the health and safety of its people", the City of Madison,
Wisconsin, cannot exclude "in practical effect ...wholesome milk produced and pasteurized in
Illinois" if reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives, adequate to conserve legitimate local
interests, are available.); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 531-32 (1949).
267. See Maltz, supra note 74, at 65.
268. Id.

269. 375 U.S. 361 (1964).
270. Id. at 364.
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distributors.27' Not surprisingly, the Court struck down the regulation as a
violation of the Commerce Clause.272
Maltz commends the result because the state had clearly prioritized "local
interest over out-of-state competitors."273 Florida used its regulatory power
to exclude outside dairy farmers from its markets based on their out-of-state
status. Such use of regulatory power undermines the free trade values of the
Commerce Clause. In short, Florida had erected a barrier to the movement
of milk based solely on state boundaries.
Most state legislatures, however, will not provide such obvious protectionism vulnerable to challenge under the Commerce Clause.274 A more sensible
approach would begin with an avowedly difficult case of state regulation as a
paradigm, the assumption being that the easy cases will take care of themselves if a principled framework can be constructed to resolve more difficult
cases. This Article argues that Hunt provides a more sound premise for
reform of the dormant Commerce Clause. Without the benefit of facial
discrimination in North Carolina's regulation, the Hunt court recognized the
disparate impact of the regulation. The Court refused to permit North
Carolina to strip the competitive advantages of outsiders, thus revealing
judicial insight at its best. The Hunt Court faced a particularly difficult
challenge because the regulation failed to discriminate on its face, requiring
the Court to go beyond the facial purpose of the regulation and examine the
real market impact on competitive advantage. These lessons of Hunt can
better instruct doctrinal reform because, in this context, state regulation is
about the "hunt" for advantage.
For Maltz, the root concern should be monitoring state regulations so
"that state boundaries per se [do not become] barriers to the movement of
goods across the United States."275 The ability of goods to move freely
across state lines should certainly inform dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence. However, a difficulty with Maltz's conception stems from its

271. Id. at 376.
272. Id. at 373.
273. Maltz, supra note 74 at 65. One could also argue that in-state distributors of milk were
prevented from buying milk from out-of-state dairy farmers, thus providing another violation of
the free trade concept. However, Maltz chooses to focus on the disadvantage to out-of-state
producers. See id.
274. Maltz's discussion freely acknowledges the grey area between clear discrimination and
a valid regulation of commerce. Id. at 67-81. In his effort to provide a comprehensive
understanding of how much regulation is too much, he handles the grey area problem by creating
many exceptions to his argument. Id.
This article attempts to integrate the manner in which the court reviews all state regulations
of commerce, irrespective of the regulation's guise. Of course, this article might be open to the
same criticism to the extent it does not address state taxation or state participation in the
marketplace.
275. Id. at 65.
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narrowness-movement of goods. The Court has consistently recognized that
the breadth and scope of commerce encompasses more than the mere shipment
of goods. Lottery tickets,276 kidnapping,2'l motel service, 2 78 restaurant
service,279 loansharking," 0 and even prostitution28 are various activities
that the Court has deemed subject to regulation under the Commerce Clause.
Maltz's understanding of the basic idea behind the Commerce Clause might
understate the expansive scope of the commerce power. In short, Maltz's free
location principle might be responsive to the specific problem of movement of
goods but is less effective for addressing other activities under the Commerce
Clause.
Even if the free location principle is appropriate, Maltz does not show
why his reliance on legislative intent will properly draw a line between
permissible and impermissible regulation. He argues that the free location
principle might invalidate regulations "that are facially neutral "2" if the
regulations displace competitive advantages but warns that "this analysis...
could easily be carried too far."2" Although Maltz offers that "legislative
intent" should separate permissible from impermissible regulations under the
free location principle, a focus on legislative intent fails to remedy the
problems of concealed legislative motive and plain discriminatory effect
against interstate commerce. Maltz's use of legislative intent would not define
the clear degree of discrimination sufficient to invalidate regulations for two
reasons: Either a bad-faith legislature could conceal its intent as Justice Clark
warned in Dean Milk Co.2" or legislation could in effect prohibit the
importation of goods under a facially neutral regulation with a nonprotectionist
purpose. 216 These are serious omissions in Maltz's model, omissions that
foreshadow a blurring of a bright-line distinction between permissible and
impermissible regulations.
C. Summary
The next Section argues that a focus on discrimination against commercial
interests outside a state can better mark a coherent line between permissible

276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124 (1936).
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913).
Maltz, supra note 74, at 66.
Id. at 66.
Id.
See Dean Milk Co., 340 U.S. at 354.
See Hunt, 432 U.S. at 352-53.
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and impermissible regulation. Maltz recognizes that the difficult task in
Commerce Clause jurisprudence is developing some principled approach for
deciding why some regulations of commerce are too much. In a sense,
Maltz's discussion leads the academic priesthood in the appropriate direction.
His choice of principles, however, is too easily manipulated. For example,
Hunt makes the strong case that facially neutral regulations should be suspect
if the result is to strip away competitive advantages from out-of-staters in the
marketplace. Moreover, a protectionist intent standard for banning a state's
regulation might not safeguard the movement of goods across state boundaries.
This criticism is tempered by a sense that Maltz is closer to asking the
right questions than other proponents of doctrinal reform. Collins, Tushnet,
and Regan all offer serious ways for bringing coherence into the jurisprudence. However, Maltz advances the academic discussion by asking the right
question about how things might be, while the contributions of Collins,
Tushnet, and Regan address matters as they are.
Of course, the easiest solution would be to discard the entire doctrine.
This decision might make the most sense but for the questionable assumptions
scholars are forced to make. Farber, Breker-Cooper, Friedman, and Eule all
share an unwarranted faith in either the ability of other constitutional
provisions to police state interference with interstate commerce, the-ability of
administrative agencies to step into the role now fulfilled by judicial review,
or the ability of Congress to replace the Court as a decisionmaker. Unless all
of these assumptions can be made, the more prudent course would be to
improve the doctrine by asking the right question: Can a principled distinction
be drawn between permissible and impermissible regulation?
IV. A DISCRIMINATION IN EFFECT MODEL
FOR COMMERCE CLAUSE ANALYSIS

This Section describes a model that better defines the line between
permissible and impermissible state regulation under the dormant Commerce
Clause than current doctrine and previous scholarship. This Section shows
that the extent of discrimination in effect can separate permissible from
impermissible regulation in a manner that respects the traditional deference
afforded states in the area of public health and safety, while at the same time
subjecting to rigorous scrutiny economic regulations that traditionally have
been suspect. This model can effectively resolve challenges to regulations in
a clear and consistent fashion. In those instances in which a state has not
regulated, such as the market participant exceptionW and state taxation of

287. "Alexandria Scrap, little noted at the time, established that '[n]othing in the purposes
animating the commerce clause prohibits a state, in the absence of congressional action, from
participating in the market and exercising the right to favor its own citizens over others.'" TRIBE,
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commerce, 2ss prevailing doctrinal principles should be applied by the
Court. 289 Discrimination should be understood as including the aggressive
and protectionist sides to state-induced disadvantage of commercial interests
without a state. Generally, the Court uses the language of "discrimination
against" 21° interstate commerce or some equivalent to convey the sense of
opposition to interstate commerce. The stance taken on interstate commerce
captures the component of discrimination that is outwardly directed. But an
effective definition of discrimination must also recognize the inward component of protectionism, a protective action favoring intrastate commerce.
Generally, the Court will refer to local industries or some equivalent to convey
the sense of defensiveness. 29 ' Perhaps the image of shields held high by

supra note 179, at 430; see also Charles Gray, Keeping the Home Team at Home, 74 CAL. L.
REv. 1329, 1344 (1986) (explaining that the market participant doctrine states "'that if a state is
acting as a market participant, rather than as a market regulator, the dormant Commerce Clause
places no limitation on its activities'" (quoting South-Central Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke, 467
U.S. 82, 93 (1984)); Ivy B. Dodes, Note, The DelawareTakeoverStatute: ConstitutionallyInfirm
Even Under the Market ParticipantException, 17 HoFsTRA L. REv. 203, 227 n.134 (1988);
Michael R. Harpring, Comment: Out Like Yesterday's Garbage: Municipal Solid Waste and the
Need For CongressionalAction,40 CATH. U. L. REv. 851, 872 (1991).
The Court has imposed limits on the ability of a state to discriminate pursuant to the market
participant doctrine. In a leading case, South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S.
82 (1984), the Court denied the State of Alaska the ability to require purchasers of state-owned
timber to process the timber within Alaska. LIEBERMAN, supra note 179, at 322. Jonathan
Phillip Meyers, Note, Confronting the Garbage Crisis: Increased FederalInvolvement As a
Means of AddressingMunicipalSolid Waste Disposal, 79 GA. L.J. 567, 575 (1991) (explaining
that the rationale behind the exception is that when a state is participating in a market, its role
is analogous to that of a private firm, and therefore the state should be allowed to choose with
whom it wants to do business); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term: Forward:
Traces of Self-Gavernment, 100 HARv. L. REV. 4, 56 n. 294 (1986).
288. TRIBE, supra note 179, at 442 ("Thus, a state tax does not offend the Commerce Clause
if it (1) is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing state, (2) is fairly
apportioned, (3) does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and (4) is fairly related to
services provided by the state."); STONE, supra note 213 at 314-15 ("As the discussion of
Complete Auto Transit indicates, the stated tests in cases challenging taxes as undue burdens on
interstate commerce differ from the stated tests in cases challenging regulations."); David Elliott
Prange, Note, Regional Water Scarcity and the Galloway Proposal, 17 ENVTL. L. 81, 102
(1986); Bruce B. Weyhrauch, Note, South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke: The
Commerce Clause and the Market ParticipantDoctrine, 15 ENVTL. L. 593, 610 n. 110 (1985).
For an overview of how state taxation doctrine developed prior to Complete Auto Transit,
Inc., see R. Douglas Harmon, Note, JudicialReview Under Complete Auto Transit: When Is A
State Tax on Energy-ProducingResources "FairlyRelated"?, 1982 DuKE L.J. 682, 684-86.
289. Cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (suggesting that state
taxation of commerce might not be different from state regulation).
290. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 461 (1981); Exxon
Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 125 (1978); Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco
Enters. Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 898 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring).
291. See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 148 (1986) ("Shielding in-state industries
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guardsmen best captures the isolationist spirit of "protectionism" as an
inwardly directed phenomena.
With this understanding of discrimination, permissible regulation should
be defined by the real effects of a regulation upon interstate commerce.29
When an economic regulation discriminates in effect to the disadvantage of
commercial interests outside a state, a heavy presumption should operate
against the regulation's validity. When a public health and safety regulation29 discriminates in effect to the disadvantage of commercial interests
outside a state, a heavy presumption should fall in favor of the regulation. In
both cases, the presumption may be overcome by contrary evidence.
In the context of the Commerce Clause, the Court has not hesitated to
strike down economic regulations, particularly those that treat interests outside
the state differently from those inside the state.294 Under a discrimination

from out-of-state competition is almost never a legitimate local purpose, and state laws that
amount to 'simple economic protectionism' consequently have been subject to a 'virtuallyper se
rule of invalidity.'" (quoting city of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978));
Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 351 (1977) ("Obviously, the
increased costs imposed by the statute would tend to shield the local apple industry from the
competition of Washington apple growers and dealers who are already at a competitive
disadvantage because of their great distance from the North Carolina market."); Baldwin v.
Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935) ("If New York .... to promote the economic welfare of her
farmers, may guard them against competition with the cheaper prices of Vermont, the door has
been opened to rivalries and reprisals that were meant to be averted by subjecting commerce
between the states to the power of the nation.").
292. This principle for defining permissible regulation is paraphrased from Tribe's description
of the Court's decisioninaking in the area of state taxation. TRIBE, supra note 179, at 442. The
Court has alluded to a similar principle in defining the focus of its review of regulations under
the dormant Commerce Clause: "In either situation [application of the per se rule of invalidity
or the balancing approach] the critical consideration is the overall effect of the statute on both
local and interstate activity." Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth.,
476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986); see also Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 37 (1980)
("The principal focus of inquiry must be the practical operation of the statute, since the validity
of state laws must be judged chiefly in terms of their probable effects.").
293. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (quarantine measures); South Carolina State
Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177 (1938) (width and weight restrictions on
trucks using state highways); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981)
(restrictions on plastic, nonreturnable, nonrefillable containers); see Huron Portland Cement Co.
v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960) (smoke abatement measures); Mintz v. Baldwin, 289
U.S. 346 (1933) (certification requirements that all cattle coming into the state are free from
Bang's disease); Erb v. Morasch, 177 U.S. 584 (1900) (restrictions on train speed within city
limits); Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829) (damming of a
creek where health of area inhabitants has been improved).
294. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 578-79
(1986) (The Court will strike down economic regulations that "directly regulate- or discriminate[] against interstate commerce, or when [their] effect is to favor in-state economic interests
over out-of-state interests...."); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)
("Thus, where simple economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually per se
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in effect model, regulations governing commercial operations would be
presumed invalid if commercial interests outside the state were disadvantaged
in effect.295 The inquiry would focus on discrimination in effect alone. The
disadvantage to outside commercial interests is caused by the effect of a
regulation in operation, not the purpose of legislators. Thus arguments about
purpose would be insufficient by themselves. Evidence of a lack of purposeful
discrimination plus health and safety interests would be admissible as contrary
evidence to overcome the presumption of invalidity, but the focus would
remain on the discriminatory effect of the challenged regulation. Even if
commercial interests could show that legislators enacted an economic
regulation with a discriminatory purpose in mind, this showing would not raise
a presumption of invalidity unless coupled with discrimination in effect to the
disadvantage of commercial interests.
Traditional deference would be afforded to health and safety regulations.296 Under this discrimination-in-effect model, health and safety
rule of invalidity has been erected."); TRIBE, supra note 179, at 413-14 ("State efforts to protect
local economic interests through measures limiting access to local markets by out-of-state sellers
or suppliers have repeatedly been struck down as inconsistent with the principles underlying the
commerce clause."). But see LIEBERMAN, supra note 179, at 174 ("Until the New Deal, the
Court had discerned many constitutional impediments to one or another form of economic
legislation. Today those impediments have practically vanished.").
295. Discrimination to the disadvantage of out-of-state commercial interests would include:
raising the cost of doing business for out-of-state commercial interests while leaving those of instate commercial counterparts unaffected, Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n,
432 U.S. 333, 351 (1977); "stripping away from the out-of-state commercial interest the
competitive and economic advantages it had earned for itself," id.; "having a leveling effect that
insidiously operates to the advantage of local commercial interests," id.; "controlling prices in
other states," Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 583
(1986); promoting the economic welfare of one's own commercial interests by guarding them
against competition with the cheaper prices of another state, Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294
U.S. 511, 522 (1935); "discriminat[ing] against interstate commerce by applying a disadvantageous rule against nonresidents for no valid state purpose that requires such a rule," Bendix
Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 898 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring);
and excluding out-of-state commercial interests from business dealings within state, Dean Milk
Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951).
296. See, e.g., Taylor, 477 U.S. at 151 ("As long as a State does not needlessly obstruct
interstate trade or attempt to 'place itself in a position of economic isolation,' Baldwin v. G.A.F.
Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935), it retains broad regulatory authority to protect the health
and safety of its citizens and the integrity of its natural resources."); City of Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 631 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[Quarantine laws have not been
considered forbidden.protectionist measures, even though they were directedagainst out-of-state
commerce."); Dean Milk Co., 340 U.S. at 358 (Black, J., dissenting) ("Since the days of Chief
Justice Marshall, federal courts have left states and municipalities free to pass bona fide health
regulations subject only 'to the paramount authority of Congress if it decides to assume control
... . '"); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 531-32 (1949) ("[Justice
Cardozo's opinion in Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc.] recognized, as we do, broad power in the
State to protect its inhabitants against perils to health or safety, fraudulent traders and highway
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regulations that disadvantage commercial interests out-of-state nonetheless
would be presumed valid. Evidence of discrimination would be similar to
criteria used for economic regulations. To overcome this presumption of
validity, challengers of a health and safety regulation would have to show
evidence of purposeful discrimination. 2'
Under this presumption, an interesting phenomenon might occur. Assume
that a state regulation advanced health and safety objectives. Unlike the Dean
Milk Co. scenario, the hypothetical state may protect the quality of its air.
There is no hidden protectionist objective among the policymakers. One could
envision a situation in which a health and safety regulation produced the same
effect in the marketplace as did the most rigid embargo. Should such a
measure be valid under a model that uses discrimination in effect as a
benchmark?29
From an analytical standpoint, this regulation should be presumed valid.
First, as a practical matter, such a regulation probably would function as
quarantine. Assuming that the regulation is clearly designed to prohibit the
importation of deleterious elements (e.g., automobile smog) the presumption
should sensibly stand. Rather than a flaw, such application illustrates the
responsiveness of the model to contingencies that might not otherwise be
adequately addressed by regulation. Second, application of the presumption
in this example is consistent with precedent. In fact, the hypothetical is based
upon Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit,299 in which the court
upheld enforcement of a City Smoke Abatement Code against an out-of-state
corporation. The Code adversely affected interstate commerce because
compliance required "[s]tructural alterations" 3" in ships engaged in interstate
commerce. Third, while discrimination in effect against commercial interests
outside a state is used as a benchmark, the objective is not to overrule those
regulations that have customarily been upheld as valid quarantines or
regulations that advance the health and safety of the community. Rather, the

hazards, even by use of measures which bear adversely upon interstate commerce."); South
Carolina State Highway Dep't. v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 189 (1938) ("In the
absence of national legislation especially covering the subject of interstate commerce, the State
may rightly prescribe uniform regulations adapted to promote safety upon its highways and the
conservation of their use, applicable alike to vehicles moving in interstate commerce and those
of its own citizens.").
297. While I generally would define purposeful discrimination as equivalent to Regan's
"purposeful protectionism," Regan's terminology is less precise because he does not recognize
that discrimination has both an aggressive and protectionist side. Protectionism merely captures
the defensive (not the aggressive) element of state regulation resulting in disadvantage to
commercial interests without the state. See supra notes 290-91 and accompanying text.
298. I am indebted to my colleague, Michael R. Belknap, for bringing this point to my
attention.
299. 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
300. Id. at 441.
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point is to provide a principled explanation for why these discriminatory health
and safety regulations should be and have been permissible.
Obviously, this model makes classification important. Presumptions will
turn on whether a regulation "is fairly related to [public health and safety]
services provided by the state." 3 " In other words, does a reasonable
interpretation of a regulation's effect fall within the Court's traditional
definition of a state's health and safety power?3" If so, then the traditional
presumption of validity of public health and safety measures should apply. Of
course, as in the Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n,3m a
regulation should not be considered a health and safety measure if "the
challenged statute does remarkably little to further that laudable goal
...."304

In the case of clear economic effect, the measure should be

considered an economic regulation and presumed impermissible.
In deciding whether a regulation should reasonably be considered
economic, evidence of purpose is significant evidence on the issue of
discrimination in effect. Regan takes the precisely opposite stance in his
proposal: "Protectionist effect will matter only as evidence of protectionist
purpose. As evidence, protectionist effect may matter a great deal, since effect
is often the best evidence of purpose. But purpose will be the key." 5 I
disagree with Regan's stance because it fails to heed the lessons of Hunt in
which a state with an ostensibly good purpose enacted a regulation with
discrimination in effect against Washington State apples.3" 6 But Regan's
description of how contrary evidence bears upon presumptions can be readily
applied in a discrimination-in-effect model as follows: "[a] state that passes a
law with significant [discriminatory purpose] would be well advised to offer
the court some innocent explanation."" An explanation of how a health
and safety purpose is furthered should lead the Court to classify a regulation
as a health and safety regulation in doubtful cases, thus gaining the advantage
of the presumption of validity.3" 8 Assuming, however, that a regulation is

301. TRIBE, supra note 179, at 442. Deciding whether a regulation bears a fair relation to
health and safety or economic effects seems eminently sensible as a means of defining statutes
under a discrimination in effect model.
302. See infra note 319 and accompanying text.
303. 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
304. Id. at 353. Although North Carolina had ostensibly "enacted [a regulation requiring all
apples sold or shipped into the State to have no grade other than the applicable federal grade on
the container] for the declared purpose of protecting consumers from deception and fraud in the
marketplace", the Court reasoned that the measure in effect "magnifies [consumer problems] by
depriving purchasers of all information concerning the quality of the contents of closed apple
containers." Id. at 353.
305. Regan, supra note 8, at 1137.
306. See supra notes 103-14 and accompanying text.
307. Regan, supra note 8, at 1136.
308. This treatment of mixed effects furthered by a regulation is analogous to the Court's
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clearly economic in effect, contrary evidence of a health and safety purpose
furthered by the regulation should overcome the presumption of invalidity.
This discrimination-in-effect model will move the inquiry back into motive
A la Dean Milk Co.3" 9 but only to the extent of providing evidence about
whether a regulation is fairly characterized as a health and safety measure and
whether such presumption can be overcome by contrary motivations. So,
motive plays a role in applying the effects model, but it does not become the
focus of the inquiry. The answer to whether a regulation is permissible or
impermissible remains centered on the extent of discrimination in effect.
This model comes into play when a regulation has discriminated against
commercial interests from outside a state. When a regulation does not
disadvantage commercial interests outside a state, the Court does not have a
basis to review a regulation for discrimination in effect. Thus, facial
discrimination in a regulation would be insufficient for judicial review unless
accompanied by discrimination in effect. 10 Without discrimination in effect,
there is no cause of action for discrimination under the dormant Commerce
Clause.
In summary, a discrimination-in-effect inquiry better marks the line
between permissible and impermissible regulation. Under the current doctrine,
the Court is not always clear about what factors enter a balancing test, whether
discrimination exists, and, if so, whether benefits flow to the state from the
regulation and whether less restrictive alternatives exist to the challenged
measure. In practice, the discrimination-in-effect model might mean that
health and safety regulations are presumed valid, notwithstanding real
disadvantage to commercial interests from without the state. Assuming there
is no hidden protectionist motive at work, such a result should be unremarkable and fairly consistent with quarantine caselaw and traditional deference to
health and safety regulation. The traditional deference to health and safety
measures is preserved to the greatest extent possible, yet economic measures
retain their disfavor under the dormant Commerce Clause. The model is
sufficiently flexible so that contrary evidence of purposeful discrimination or
the lack thereof can overcome presumptions. Most importantly, this model
gives clear and consistent guidance about the limits of permissible discrimination in effect without the need for intricate exceptions and qualifications."'
treatment of regulations under the Takings Clause that further prohibited both private and
permissible public purposes. See Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
309. See infra notes 317-19 and accompanying text.
310. The same principle can be applied to facially neutral statutes as well. Discrimination in
effect provides the touchstone for judicial review, regardless of a discriminatory intent or motive.
These issues, as discussed earlier, should bear upon evidentiary questions of classification and
effect but should not in and of themselves provide a challenger with sufficient standing to bring
suit. Challengers of discriminatory regulations suffer actual injury due to the disadvantage
inflicted by the challenged regulation, not formal or concealed expressions of purpose.
311. See Maltz, supra note 74 at 67-85. As noted earlier, this model does not encompass

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

57

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 2
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:381

This Section has presented a better way for the Court to review regulations under the Commerce Clause when Congress has failed to regulate. The
Court can and should approach all commercial activity with an inquiry about
the real discrimination in effect. This clear inquiry would better enable the
Court to separate permissible from impermissible regulation. Rather than
abandon the important role of the Court, a discrimination in effect model
builds upon the Court's current discrimination jurisprudence. If the Court
adopts this model, state lawmakers and challengers of regulations would have
the advantage of consistent decisionmaking tied to the real discrimination in
effect suffered by commercial interests from outside a state.
V. SEVERAL ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE DISCRIMINATION IN EFFECT MODEL
This Section illustrates how the proposed model would resolve dormant
Commerce Clause cases in a better way than current doctrine. The Section
begins by showing how presumptions based on the character of a regulation
can offer a logical line between permissible and impermissible regulation.
Then, the Section demonstrates how the flexibility of permitting contrary
evidence of character or purpose to overcome initial presumptions in a sensible
fashion would operate. The Section concludes with examples that highlight
difficulties outside the parameters of this model.
A. Presumptions
A raging debate among evidence scholars centers around the significance
of presumptions.312 Some favor the "bursting bubble" theory whereby "a
presumption has the effect of shifting the burden of production in order to
rebut the presumed fact. "313 Simply put, the presumption disappears "[i]f
the party against whom the presumption exists produces contrary evidence.
. ..

"314

A competing theory would allow the presumption to "remain until

the presumed fact is actually disproven[,]"

315

thus turning the litigation battle

state participation in the marketplace and taxation because these state actions do not fall within
the classic form of state regulation. The prevailing doctrines in these areas would continue to
govern under this proposal.
312. See, e.g., Nicholas W. Chase, The North Dakota Supreme Court's Examinationof the
Hicks Rationale Prompts the Court to Customize its Own Standard to Review State-Based
Employment Discrimination Claims, 70 N.D. L. REV. 207, 218 n.94 (1994); Catherine J.
Lanctot, The DefendantLies and the PlaintiffLoses: The Fallacy of the "Pretext-Plus"Rule in
Employment DiscriminationCases, 43 HAsTINGs L.J. 57, 104 (1991); Captain Charles E. Trant,
The American MilitaryInsanity Defense: A Moral, Philosophical,andLegal Dilemma, 99 MIL.
L. REv. 1, 95-96 (1983).
313. See, e.g., Chase, supra note 312, at 218 n.94.
314. Id.
315. Id.
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into one of persuasion rather than mere production of contrary evidence.
Under the proposed model, the second theory would govern presumptions.
Presumptions are central to the functioning of the model; therefore, employing
a burden of persuasion rule will better buttress the initial presumptions.
Compared to the "bursting bubble" theory, the burden of persuasion approach
will increase the burden of proof for litigants introducing contrary evidence.
So, if a regulation is best characterized as a public safety and health
measure, the Court should presume the regulation is valid. Challengers would
have fair opportunity to overcome this presumption, but the production of a
mere scintilla of contrary evidence would not burst the bubble. Rather,
challengers would need to disprove facts indicating a health and safety effect.
When a regulation can best be characterized as an economic regulation in
effect, then the Court should presume that the regulation is invalid. As with
health and safety regulations, this presumption could be overcome with
evidence disproving facts about the economic nature of the regulation.
Clear presumptions based on the character of a regulation can offer a
logical line between permissible and impermissible regulation. However, for
the presumption to be meaningful, the presumption must be overcome by
contrary evidence that disproves presumed facts. Any other evidentiary
approach could render the presumptions illusory.
B. Contrary Evidence
The presumption should control when litigants are unable to offer contrary
evidence to disprove presumed facts. In the case of a health and safety
regulation, a litigant wishing to remove the presumption of validity would have
the burden of proof on the question of purposeful discrimination. In practice,
a litigant would be able to disprove presumed facts by showing that the
regulation was enacted with the intent or motive of (1) protecting local
commercial interests, (2) disadvantaging out-of-state commercial interests, or
more specifically (3) stripping away competitive advantages achieved in the
marketplace by out-of-state interests.316
For example, the City of Madison in Dean Milk Co.3" 7 only permitted
milk pasteurized within five miles of Capitol Square in Madison to be sold in
Madison. As a practical matter, the regulation prohibited commercial interests
outside the state from selling milk in Madison." 8 Although the city attempted to portray the regulation as a needed health and safety measure to protect
the sanitary standards of milk sold within city limits, the evidence indicated
that the city likely would have fallen back on an alternative "based on § 11 of

316. See Huntv. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333,350-51 (1976).
317. Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 355 (1951).
318. Id. at 354.
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the Model Milk Ordinance recommended by the United States Public Health
Service." 319 This Model Milk Ordinance operated by "exclud[ing] from the
municipality milk not produced and pasteurized conformably to standards as
high as those enforced by the receiving city."3 " Given the availability of
an alternative measure for protecting sanitary standards in the city's milk and
the nominal safety benefits of a rigid geographical limitation around Madison,
the city would be unable to disprove the facts of the ordinance's economic
impact. The ordinance clearly protected in-state economic interests to the
disadvantage of out-of-state economic interests.
Even if we assume that the Court characterized the Madison regulation as
a health and safety regulation in effect, contrary evidence of a discriminatory
purpose would be available to disprove this characterization. First, the
regulation offered no safety advantages over the Model Milk Ordinance. The
ordinance clearly permitted receiving cities like Madison to insist upon high
sanitary standards, thus calling into question the real gains of the ordinance
enacted by the city. Second, the ordinance clearly protects local interests in
the processing industry without question. Those businesses fortunate enough
to be located within five miles of Capitol Square acquired a captive market for
their processing services. Third, out-of-state interests were prohibited from
selling their milk to Madison buyers unless local processors were used to
bottle the milk. Given the nominal evidence of safety gains and the compelling evidence of economic protectionism, the challengers would have little
difficulty defeating the presumption favoring a health and safety measure with
indications of purposeful discrimination.
C. The Dilemma of Undue Burden
This Subsection discusses the difficulty of addressing nondiscriminatory
regulations that burden the flow of interstate commerce.32' This Subsection
argues that the case for abandoning the judicial role is most sensible when
weighing the "national and local interests and making a choice as to which of

319. Id. at 355.
320. Id.
321. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981) (regulating
the length of vehicles that may use Iowa's highways); Raymond Motor Transp. v. Rice, 434 U.S.
429 (1978) (regulating the use of 65-foot doubles within the State); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines,
Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959) (regulating the use of a certain type of rear fender mudguard on trucks
operating on highways within State not challenged as discriminatory); Southern Pac. Co. v.
Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (regulating operation within the State of railroad
trains with more than fourteen passenger or seventy freight cars); Seaboard Air Line Ry. v.
Blackwell, 244 U.S. 310 (1917) (requiring trains to blow their whistles and slow down almost
to a stop at each grade crossing where numerous grade crossings were involved).
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the two should prevail. That, as I see the matter, is a policy judgment." 32
Finally, this Subsection outlines the consequences of adopting the proposed
discrimination in effect model.
While the proposed model will better resolve dormancy cases than current
doctrine, the model creates a judicial blindspot for the Court when burdensome

regulations do not discriminate in effect against commercial interests without

the state.123 Current doctrine empowers the Court to protect the flow of
interstate commerce by balancing the benefits to a state against the burden on
interstate commerce. 324 With balancing, the Court can define undue and
thus impermissible burdens on commerce as circumstances in which the
burdens outweigh the benefits. The results of balancing in this context can be
fairly characterized as inconsistent and unclear315 but the balancing doctrine
provides an important check on burdensome regulations.326
Under the proposed model, a regulation that burdens the flow of interstate
commerce will be upheld absent discrimination in effect against commercial
interests without the State. For example, Illinois passed a regulation
"requiring the use of a certain type of rear fender mudguard on trucks and
trailers operated on the highways of that State." 327 Because the regulation
applied equally to interstate and intrastate commerce, the challengers of the
regulation did not allege regulatory discrimination against interstate commerce. 31 The Court found a "rather massive showing of burden on inter-

322. Dowling, supra note 1, at 21.
323. See Kassel, 450 U.S. at 674 (Iowa's law added about$12.6 million each year to the costs
of trucking companies); Raymond Motor Transp., 434 U.S. at 439 n. 14 ("[IIt costs the company
in excess of $2 million annually to make the various adjustments in operations."); Bibb, 359 U.S.
at 525 ("mhe initial cost of installing those mudguards on all the trucks owned by the appellants
ranged from $4,500 to $45,840."); SeaboardAir Line Ry., 244 U.S. at 310 ("[Mlore than six
hours would have been added to the schedule time of four hours and thirty minutes."); Southern
Pac., 325 U.S. at772 ("The additional cost of operation of trains complying with the Train Limit
Law in Arizona amounts ... to about $1,000,000 a year.").
324. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
325. See supra notes 65-102 and accompanying text.
326. However, Eule states:
Our needs today differ significantly from those of the 1940s when the Court embraced
Professor Dowling's suggestion that its proper role, in the absence of congressional
action, was to balance national and local interests in scrutinizing state commercial
enactments. Congress, the implied beneficiary of the Court's protection under that
standard, no longer needs such assistance.
Eule, supra note 14, at 428.
327. Bibb, 359 U.S. at 521-22.
328. Id. at 523. Assuming the group of interstate motor carriers had made an argument that
Illinois's facially neutral regulation discriminated in effect against commercial interests without
the State, it is unclear whether the Court would have found impermissible discrimination under
the dormant commerce clause. Compare Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n,
432 U.S. 333 (1977) (finding the state's statute to burden and discriminate against interstate sales)
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state commerce" 329 and no safety advantages.330 Whereas the Illinois
regulation would have been upheld under the proposed model for lack of
discrimination in effect, the Court concluded that "this is one of those
cases-few in number-where local safety measures that are nondiscriminatory
33
place an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce." '
While the result in Bibb furthers the national interest in an unburdened
flow of commerce, the case involved an inherent weighing of the national
interest against the local interest in police power regulation. 332 Policy
judgments that require a weighing of the national interest in unburdened free
trade against a state's interest in safety are more appropriate for legislative
than judicial decisionmaking. 333 Absent discrimination in effect, several
reasons support congressional decisionmaking as a better vehicle for deciding
when the national interest in an unburdened flow of commerce needs to be
furthered.
First, congressional decisionmaking is based upon consensus and
compromise. 334 Members of Congress routinely balance national interests

with Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117 (1978) (finding the state statute did not
burden or discriminate against interstate commerce).
329. Bibb, 359 U.S. at 528.
330. Id. at 525. Underscoring the point, the district court found evidence of new safety
hazards created by the regulation:
[Tlhere is rather convincing testimony that use of the contour flaps creates hazards
previously unknown to those using the highways. [Navajo Freight Lines, Inc. v.
Bibb, 159 F. Supp. 385, 390 (1958).] These hazards were found to be occasioned
by the fact that this new type of mudguard tended to cause an accumulation of heat
in the brake drum, thus decreasing the effectiveness of brakes, and by the fact they
were susceptible of being hit and bumped when the trucks were backed up and of
falling off on the highway.
Id.
331. Id. at 529.
332. Compare id. at 523 ("The power of the State to regulate the use of its highways is broad
and pervasive. We have recognized the peculiarly local nature of this subject of safety, and have
upheld state statutes applicable alike to interstate and intrastate commerce, despite the fact that
they may have an impact on interstate commerce.") (citations omitted) with id. at 529 ("[S]tate
regulations that run afoul of the policy of free trade reflected in the Commerce Clause must also
bow.").
333. Cf. supra notes 65-102 and accompanying text. While this article disagrees with those
commentators who urge total removal of the judicial role from the dormant Commerce Clause,
the argument for removal of judicial review is strongest when the Court engages in the
policymaking of deciding whether X safety benefit is greater than Y burden on interstate
commerce. See also Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
334. Alan L. Feld, Separationof PoliticalPowers:Boundariesor Balance?,21 GA. L. REV.
171, 178 (1986); Peter E.Quint, The Separationof Powers Under Carter,62 TEx. L. REV. 785,
794 (1984); Mary H. Strobel, Note, DelegationandIndividualRights,56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1321,
1334 (1983).
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against local interests in making policy decisions.335 Accommodating these
competing policy interests when "evenhanded state legislation . . . burdens
interstate commerce too heavily"3" is a responsibility tailor-made for the
political process.337
Second, congressional decisionmaking about the importance of the
national interest in the unburdened flow of commerce will be more consistent
than judicial decisionmaking.338 The Court has traditionally deferred to
congressional regulation of commerce.339 Indeed, commentators openly
question whether the Commerce Clause as interpreted by the Court has
established meaningful limits on the power of Congress to regulate commerce." By way of contrast, the Court has not hesitated to overrule lower
courts in their review of state regulation. 41 Thus, congressional decisionmaking about the limits of undue burdens on commerce should be more

335. See Eule, supra note 14, at 436 ("Under the Court's present standard, the likelihood of
judicial invalidation increases with the degree of burden imposed by state law, and the weight of
the national interest. But this is precisely the situation in which action by Congress or
administrative agencies is most likely.")

336. Id.
337. In 1887 Congress created the Interstate Commerce Commission. Edward C. Donovan,
The Interstate Commerce Commission and the Boundaries of Agency Discretion in Statutory
Interpretation,60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1357, 1357-58 (1992). Designed to regulate the railroad
industry, the Commission over the years developed a noteworthy reputation for its independent
and balanced decisionmaking. See, e.g., George M. Chandler, The Interstate Commerce
Commission-The First Twenty-Five Years, 16 TRANSP. L.J. 53 (1987); Paul S. Dempsey, The
Interstate Commerce Commission-The First Century of Economic Regulation, 16 TRANSP. L.J.
1 (1987). But see Paul S. Dempsey, The Interstate Commerce Commission-Disintegrationof an
American Legal Institution, 34 AM. U. L. REv. 1, 2 (1984) (suggesting that many now "view
the Commission with contempt").
338. See Kenneth W. Starr, JudicialReview in the Post-ChevronEra, 3 YALE J. ON REG.
283, 303 (1986) (claiming that policy determinations by Congress are much less likely to be
overturned by the Court than lower court policy determinations).
339. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbachv. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111 (1942); see also Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528
(1985). But see New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992); National League of Cities
v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528 (1985).
340. See TRIBE, supra note 179, at 316 ("Contemporary commerce clause doctrine grants
Congress such broad power that judicial review of the affirmative authorization for congressional
action is largely a formality."); LIEBERMAN, supra note 179, at 116 ("Today the commerce
power gives Congress carte blanche to regulate any aspect of the economy that even remotely
'affects' interstate commerce."). But see TRIBE, supra note 179, at 313.
341. See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,
437 U.S. 617 (1978); Dean Milk Co. v. City of City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951); H.P.
Hood & Sons, Inc., v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949); Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373
(1946). But see Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways, 450 U.S. 662 (1981); Bibb v. Navajo
Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

63

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 2
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:381

consistent and stable than judicial decisionmaking.
Third, the national interest in the free flow of commerce 342 warrants
federal preemption of burdensome regulations.3 43 The Court has long
recognized the need for a single uniform national rule where the national
interest is at stake. 3 4 Although
[t]here is no clear-cut policy pronouncement concerning when or why
Congress preempts . . . a predominant function of preemption is to

invalidate state laws that frustrate the development of necessary, uniform
federal laws. Additionally, preemption often acts as a means of stopping
states from interfering with the free flow of goods across state lines. 345

342. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 372 (1976); Southern Pac., 325
U.S. at 796; California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109, 116 (1941); Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273
U.S. 34, 44 (1927) (Stone, J., dissenting) ("Mhe national interest in maintaining the freedom
of commerce across state lines

. .

."); see also, Marcia Lyn Finkelstein, Note, Comity and

Tragedy: The Case of Rule 407, 38 VAND. L. RaV. 585, 621 n.280 (1985) ("Moreover, the
interstate commerce cases indirectly illustrate that safety is a local concern, which the Court has
balanced against a national interest in the free flow of commerce.") (citations omitted); John E.
Gardner, Editorial Note, FederalLabor Law Preemptionof State Wrongful Discharge Claims,
58 U. CIN. L. Rv. 491, 492 (1989) (explaining that Congress has the power to regulate
commerce which affects the national interest under the Commerce Clause to the Constitution).
343. "Under the SUPREMACY CLAUSE [U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 federal law preempts-that
is supersedes-inconsistent state law." LIEBERMAN, supra note 179, at 392. See GERALD
GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 291 (12th ed. 1991) ("Congress often plays a decisive role in
determining the relations between state and federal power."); David F. Welsh, Environmental
Marketingand FederalPreemptionof State Law: Eliminatingthe "Gray" Behind the "Green",
81 CAL. L. REv. 991, 1004 (1993); see also Frank S. Alexander, Mortgage Prepayment: The
Trial of Common Sense, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 288, 335 (1987) (explaining that the federal
government preempted state due-on-sale clause provisions due to "market significance of uniform
mortgage instruments"); cf. Larry J. Gusman, Note, Rethinking Boyle v. United Technologies
Corp. Government ContractorDefense: JudicialPreemption of the Doctrine of Separationof
Powers?, 39 AM. U. L. Rv. 391, 427-28 (1990) (describing Justice Brennan's observation that
justification for federal preemption of state law is congressional action, "not the Court's creative
powers"); Dennis Honabach & Roger Dennis, The Seventh Circuitand the Marketfor Corporate
Control,65 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 681, 731 (1989) (recounting Judge Posner's thought that absent
discrimination, "a state may legislative aggressively in ways that affect interstate commerce,
subject only to federal preemption"). But see Ronald D. Rotunda, The Doctrine of the Inner
PoliticalCheck, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and FederalPreemption, 53 TRANSP. PRAC.
J. 263, 268 (1986) ("The Commerce Clause does not demand a free trade zone; only the dormant
Commerce Clause requires a federal common market.").
344. See Bibb, 359 U.S. at 527 (1959) (recognizing the need for national uniformity in the
regulations for interstate travel) (citing Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 386 (1946)); see also
Southern Pac., 325 U.S. at 767 (discussing the necessity of a single authority when national
uniformity is needed); Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851)
(explaining that whenever the nature of a power is national, it requires exclusive legislation by
Congress).
345. Welsh, supra note 343, at 1014.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol46/iss3/2

64

1995]

Twyman: Beyond Purpose: Addressing State Discrimination In Interstate Com
DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE

Burdensome regulations run afoul of the national interest in the free flow of
commerce and are thus logically addressed by Congress under its Commerce
Clause346 and Supremacy Clause power. 7
Without congressional regulation, the difficult cases of nondiscriminatory
burdens on commerce would remain unaddressed. Transportation costs and
operating expenses could mount if states were free to regulate on a nondiscriminatory basis without regard to consequential burdens.34 Yet, these
consequential burdens on the national interest are best addressed in a national
policymaking forum, not the judicial branch.349 Moreover, the danger of
congressional failure to respond to consequential burdens on interstate
commerce might not be that great in at least the transportation field.
VI. ADVANTAGES OF A DISCRIMINATION IN EFFECT MODEL
Aside from this dilemma of nondiscriminatory, burdensome regulations,
the proposed model has several advantages over current doctrine. First, state
lawmakers will have clear knowledge of the rules defining permissible and

346. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl.3.
347. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 ("[Ihe laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance [of the Constitution]... shall be the supreme Law of the Land;... any Thing in the
Constitutionor Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."). Professor Tribe writes that
"[s]o long as Congress acts within an area delegated to it, the preemption of conflicting state or
local action-and the validation of congressionally authorized state or local action-flow directly
from the substantive power of the congressional action coupled with the supremacy clause of
article VI." TRIBE, supra note 179, at 479.
348. See, e.g., Raymond Motor Transp., 434 U.S. at 439 n.14 (burden on one interstate
carrier was more than $2 million annually); Bibb, 359 U.S. at 525 (burden ranged from $4,500
to $45, 840 per carrier); Southern Pac., 325 U.S. at 772 (burden of about $2,000,000 per year
for railroads).
349. See Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("Weighing the governmental interests of a State against the needs of interstate
commerce is, by contrast, a task squarelywithin the responsibilityof Congress ... and 'ill suited
to the judicial function.'" (citing CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 95
(1987)) (Scalia, J. concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)); Morgan v. Virginia, 328
U.S. 373, 387 (1946) (Black, J., concurring) ("I think that whether state legislation imposes an
'undue burden' on interstate commerce raises pure questions of policy, which the Constitution
intended should be resolved by the Congress."); Eule, supra note 14, at 436 n.57 (pointing out
that Justice Douglas viewed Congressional authority as "paramount" for preventing burdensome
regulations in field of interstate carrier regulation). But see H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., v. Du Mond
336 U.S. 525, 545-46 (1949) (Black, J., dissenting) ("[lit is inconceivable that Congress could
pass uniform national legislation capable of adjustment and application to all the local phases of
interstate activities that take place in the 48 states.").
Under this proposed discrimination in effect model, for example, the Arizona regulation in
Southern Pacificwould have been upheld absent evidence of discrimination. See Southern Pac.,
325 U.S. at 784-95 (Black, J., dissenting).
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impermissible regulation. Absent congressional regulation, the Court will
review a.regulation for discrimination in effect. If a state regulation
discriminates in effect, then clear presumptions will flow from the character
of the regulation. Thus, the need to second-guess the Court's balancing
calculus will be eliminated. 5 °
Second, the model allows for flexibility in the judicial decisionmaking
process while maintaining these clear presumptions. Whether a regulation is
presumed permissible or impermissible is rebuttable by contrary evidence of
the nature of discriminatory effect plus discriminatory purpose or the lack
thereof. Thus, the Court will have the flexibility to respond to the particular
facts of each case without the encumbrance of rigid per se rules that have
351
proven unworkable.
Third, congressional regulation should increase in nontransportation
areas. 3 2 For the reasons discussed earlier, congressional activity should be
welcomed in areas in which the flow of commerce is burdened. Congress has
the power under the Commerce Clause to regulate uniform rules for the
country. 5 3 More importantly, Congress has the unique expertise for making
what are essentially policy decisions about the national interest in the free flow
35 4
of trade.
This Subsection has discussed the dilemma of nondiscriminatory
burdensome regulations as well as advantages of the proposed model. The
model presumes a judicial blindness to nondiscriminatory burdens on interstate
commerce. Disputes about consequential burdens on commerce may delay
triggering a congressional response until the political process forces a
response. Accordingly, burdens could fester longer under the proposed model
than current doctrine.355

350. Compare TRIBE, supra note 179, at 419 (discussing Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v.
Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978), wherein "Wisconsin made no effort to rebut a massive array of
evidence showing that the [truck-length] regulation made no real contribution to highway safety")
with Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways, 450 U.S. 662, 671-72 (1981) ("Iowa made a more
serious effort to support the safety rationale of its [truck length] law than did Wisconsin, but its
effort was no more persuasive.").
351. Compare City of Philadelphiav. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) ("Thus, where
simple economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity
has been erected." (citations omitted)) with Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md, 437 U.S. 117, 125
(1978) (holding that a regulation that has effect of protecting in-state independent dealers from
out-of-state competition does not discriminate against interstate commerce at the retail level).
352. GUNTHER, supra note 343, at 226.
353. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
354. See supra notes 333-49 and accompanying text.
355. Cf. Eule, supra note 14, at 436 ("Under the Court's present standard, the likelihood of
judicial invalidation increases with the degree of burden imposed by state law, and the weight of
the national interest. But this is precisely the situation in which action by Congress or
administrative agencies is most likely."). Eule implies that the timing of political and judicial
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This disadvantage is outweighed by a number of certain advantages under
the proposal. A series of clear presumptions will better define permissible and
impermissible regulation. Unworkable per se rules will be discarded in favor
of flexible rebuttable presumptions. Finally, the national interest in the flow
of commerce would be furthered by congressional decisionmaking, not judicial
decisionmaking. With clear rebuttable presumptions rooted in precedent, the
"'negative side' of the Commerce Clause [would be less] hopelessly confused. "356
VII. CONCLUSION
The hunt for advantage pervades Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
Scholars and justices recognize this quest but the quarrel has been about
whether judicial review should be discarded or reformed. This Article has
argued that the Court must ask questions about commercial disadvantage to
interests without a regulating state. While scholars might continue arguing
whether wrong answers are better than no answer at all from the Court, this
Article presumes the best answer of all is the right answer . . . to the right
question.

intervention against burdensome regulations might be similar.
356. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways, Corp. 450 U.S. 662, 706 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
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